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INTRODUCTION

Within ... zoning districts, the [local] legislative body may
regulate and restrict the erection, construction,
reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings and
structures, and the use of land. 1

A.

The Acts

The Municipal Land Use Development and Management
Ace (the "City Act") empowers cities and towns in Utah to
divide or "zone" the territory within their boundaries into districts and to regulate land uses therein. The County Land Use
Development and Management Ace (the "County Act") similarly empowers counties to zone the territory within their boundaries and to regulate land uses therein. Both of these acts
(sometimes referred to hereinafter as "the acts" or "the enabling acts") were adopted in 1991 4 and amended in 1992.5
They are the only comprehensive revision of Utah zoning enabling law to be enacted by the Utah State Legislature since
the adoption of the first zoning enabling law for cities in 1925,6
and the first zoning enabling law for counties in 1941. 7

B.

Background

Although zoning existed in the United States before the
mid-1920s, 8 it gained a measure of legitimacy during that period because of two events: (1) the promulgation and near universal adoption of the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act; and,
(2) the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Village
of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 9

1. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-405(1)(b) (1992), 17-27-405(1)(b) (1991).
2. !d. §§ 10-9-101 to -1003.
3. !d. §§ 17-27-101 to -1003 (1991).
4. Planning and Zoning Revisions, ch. 235, 1991 Utah Laws 873.
5. Planning and Zoning Amendments, ch. 23, 1992 Utah Laws 181.
6. Cities to Regulate Size of Buildings, Use of Land, Etc., ch. 119, 1925
Utah Laws 240 (repealed 1991).
7. Zoning and Planning Commission, ch. 23, 1941 Utah Laws 29 (repealed
1991).
8. 6 RICHARD R. POWELL & PATRICK J. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
'II 867[1][a] (1993).
9. 272 U.S. 365 (1926); see 6 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 8, 'II 867[1][a].
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1. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act
In 1924, the United States Department of Commerce published a model land-use enabling act entitled the Standard
State Zoning Enabling Act (Standard Act). 10 "By 1925, 19
states had used the act in drafting state zoning enabling statutes."11 In 1926, the Department issued a revised edition of
the Standard Act, and by 1930 it was reported that the act
"had been adopted as a whole or in part by 35 state legislature[s]."12
Utah was caught up in the popular tide created by the
Standard Act and in 1925 adopted its first enabling act for
cities, 1a which was nearly identical to the Standard Act. 14 In
1945, this enabling act for cities was substantially augmented
by the adoption of a Municipal Planning Enabling Act. 15
As noted above, a first enabling act for counties was not
adopted until 1941. 16 The language of this first zoning enabling act for counties was substantially different than the
Standard Act. 17

2.

Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.

The second event contributing to the legitimacy of zoning
was the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Village
of Euclid u. Ambler Realty Co. 18 Prior to Euclid, the constitutionality of zoning had been suspect, but in that decision the
Supreme Court affirmed that zoning was, in general, a proper
exercise of governmental police power and not an unconstitutional taking of private property. 19

10. 6 POWELL & ROHAN, supra note 8, 'II 867[2][ii].
11. 4 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZoNING § 2.21 (3d ed. 1986).
12. !d. (quoting M. LOHMANN, PRINCIPLES OF CITY PLANNING 253 (1931)).
13. Cities to Regulate Size of Buildings, Use of Land, Etc., ch. 119, 1925
Utah Laws 240 (repealed 1991).
14. Compare Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, quoted tn 4 ANDERSON,
supra note 11, § 2.21, with Cities to Regulate Size of Buildings, Use of Land, Etc.,
ch. 119, § 7, 1925 Utah Laws 240, 242-44 (repealed 1991).
15. Municipal Planning Enabling Act, ch. 23, 1945 Utah Laws 63 (repealed
1991).
16. Zoning and Planning Commission, ch. 23, 1941 Utah Laws 29 (repealed
1991).
17. Compare Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, quoted in 4 ANDERSON,
supra note 11, § 2.21, with Zoning and Planning Commission, ch. 23, 1941 Utah
Laws 29 (repealed 1991).
18. 272 u.s. 365 (1926).
19. !d. at 368.
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Review of Zoning Law and Proposed Changes

Since Utah's adoption of the first enabling acts in 1925
(cities and towns) and 1941 (counties), both enabling acts have
been amended on a piecemeal basis, culminating in their complete revision in 1991. In addition, the Utah Supreme Court
and, more recently, the Utah Court of Appeals, have handed
down over 70 decisions explaining how Utah zoning law should
be applied.
The purpose of this article is twofold: first, to bring the
current enabling acts and court decisions together into a general review of Utah zoning law; and, second, to propose changes
in the enabling acts. In this article, separate reference is not
made to "city" zoning law or "county" zoning law unless, in fact,
a difference in the law exists. Each of the proposed changes is
described under the heading, Proposed Legislative Change, with
the proposed statutory modification language appearing in the
footnotes.
II.

THE PLANNING COMMISSION

The planning commission typically . . . has a major (and
sometimes final) role in processing special-exceptions/conditional uses, in considering proposed subdivision
maps and site plans, and in preparing general plans. 20

A.

Creation of a Planning Commission

A planning commission is created by the local legislative
body and is required for the exercise of zoning powers. 21 The
statutory language governing the creation of a planning commission is permissive. 22 However, necessary functions like the
creation of a general plan, recommending a zoning ordinance
and amendments thereto, as well as recommending a subdivision ordinance and amendments thereto, cannot be accomplished without a planning commission. 23 Therefore, a planning commission is necessary and not optional.

20.
(1981).
21.
22.
23.

ROBERT C. ElLICKSON & A. DAN TARLOCK, LAND-USE CONTROLS 214
UTAH Com; ANN. §§ 10-9-201 (1992), 17-27-201 (1991).

ld. §§ 10-9-201(1)(a), 17-27-201(1)(a)(i).
I d. §§ 10-9-204(1), (2), (4), 17-27 -204(1), (2), (4).
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Proposed Legislative Change. A planning commission is necessary, and both acts are misleading where they provide that
local units "may enad an ordinance establishing a planning
commission."24 Both acts should be amended to provide that
each city or county shall appoint a planning commission. 25

B.

Commission Membership

A city zoning ordinance establishes the number and terms
of members, the mode of their appointment, procedures for
filling vacancies, and removal of members from office. 26 This
complete flexibility is not permitted in counties where the
membership of a county planning commission is fixed by
statute at seven members. 27 Each member of a county board
serves a staggered three-year term. 28 Subject to these limitations, a county zoning ordinance prescribes the mode of appointment of commission members, their possible removal, and
the filling of vacancies. 29 Provisions in the former county enabling act which required a county commissioner to serve on a
planning commission have been repealed. 30 In both cities and
counties, board members may be paid a per diem compensation
and be reimbursed for expenses. 31
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no apparent reason to
deny counties the flexibility permitted to cities regarding the
number and terms of planning commission members. The
county act should be amended to provide that a county zoning
ordinance may define the number and terms of planning
commission members. In addition, the city act should require
staggered terms, as the county act does. 32

24. ld. §§ 10-9-201(1)(a), 17-27-201(1)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
25. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-201(1) and 17-27-201(1) should be
amended to provide:
(1)(a) Each municipality shall enact an ordinance establishing a planning
commission.
26. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-201(1)(b) (1992).
27. Id. § 17-27-201(1)(a)(ii) (1991).
28. ld. § 17-27-201(1)(a)(iii), (iv).
29. Id. § 17-27-201(1)(b).
30. Compare id. § 17-27-2 (repealed 1991) with Planning and Zoning Revisions, ch. 235, sec. 61, § 17-27-201, 1991 Utah Laws 873, 890.
31. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-201(2) (1992), 17-27-201(2) (1991).
32. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-201(1)(b){ii) should be amended to
provide:

1]
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Organization and Procedure

In cities and counties, general organizational details and
procedures for a planning commission are established in the
zoning ordinance.a3 Examples of these details and procedures
are as follows: the election of a commission chairperson34 and
his or her term of office (in counties, the chairperson is limited
to a one-year term 35 ); the election of a commission vice-chairperson and his or her term of office 36 ; the appointment of alternate members, if any, and the mode of their appointmenta 7 ;
possible removal and the filling of vacancies38 ; the calling of
meetingsa 9 ; open meeting requirements40 ; and, the maintenance and classification of planning commission records. 41
Proposed Legislative Change. No apparent reason exists to
limit a county planning commission chair to a one-year term
while allowing a city planning commission chairperson the
flexibility to serve longer periods. The county act should be
amended to repeal the provision that limits a county planning
commission chairperson to a one-year term. 42

A planning commission may adopt its own policies and
procedures. 43 However, the zoning ordinance may require that
those policies and procedures be approved by the particular
legislative body before they take effect. 44

(1)(b)(ii) the number and terms of the members, who shall serve staggered terms;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-201(1)(a)(iii) and (iv) should be repealed; and, UTAH
CODE ANN. § 17-27-201(1)(a)(ii) should be amended to provide:
(1)(a)(ii) [The commission shall eonsist of se¥en mem13ers appointed by
the ehief eJ£eet~tive effieer with the aElviee ana eonsent of the legislati¥e
~] The ordinance shall define the number and terms of the members,
who shall serve staggered terms.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-201(1)(b) (1992), 17-27-201(1)(b) (1991).
!d. § 10-9-202(1).
!d. § 17-27-202(1)(b) (1991).
!d. § 10-9-201(1J(b)(iv) (1992).
!d.
!d.
!d. § 10-9-202(2)(a).
!d.; see infra text accompanying note 512.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-20l(l)(b)(iv), -202(2)(a) (1992).
Specifically, UTAH CoDE ANN. § 17-27-202(1)(b) (1991) should be repealed.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-202(2)(a) (1992), 17-27-202(2)(a) (1991).
!d. §§ 10-9-202(2)(b), 17-27 -202(2)(b).
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Prior to 1991, the city and county enabling acts implied
that planning commissions had contracting powers independent
of the municipalities and counties they served. On that point,
the Municipal Planning Enabling Act (adopted in 1945) provided that a city planning commission could "appoint ... employees and staff" and "contract with city planners and other consultants."45 In addition, the original county enabling act
(adopted in 1941) provided that a county planning commission
"shall have the power and authority to employ experts and a
staff."46 Both of these provisions were repealed in 1991Y It
is now clear that the legislative body may control the "policies
and procedures" of the planning commission. 48

D.

Meetings and Records

A planning commission is a "public body" and therefore
subject to open meetings requirements which, in general, require all meetings to be open to the public. 49 But if the commission is required to make a decision which is 'judicial" in nature, the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Common
Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Service Commission 50 allows the
"decision making" phase of the meeting to be a closed meeting.st
The records of a planning commission are "public records"
and thus generally subject to public inspection. 52 However, it
is possible that some information related to commercial 53 or
real estate transactions 54 may be protected from public inspection.

4fi. Municipal Planning Enabling Act, ch. 23, § 1, 194fi Utah Laws 63, 63 (repealed 1991).
46. Zoning and Planning Commission, ch. 23, § 3, 1941 Utah Laws 29, 29
(repealed 1991).
47. Planning and Zoning Revisions, ch. 23fi, 1991 Utah Laws 873, 877, 890.
48. UTAH CoDF: ANN. §§ l0-9-202(2)(b) (1992), 17-27-202(2)(b) (1991).
49. !d. § 52-4-3 (1989). Statutory exceptions to open meeting requirements are
not normally applicable to the business of a planning commission. !d. § fi2-4-5(1)(a)
(Supp. 1994).
50. 598 P.2d 1312, 1315 (Utah 1979).
51. For a discussion of opening meeting requirements in connection with a
zoning board, see infra text accompanying note 512.
52. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-201 (1993).
53. !d. § 63-2-304(2).
54. !d. § 63-2-304(6), (7).
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Powers and Duties

A planning commission has eight enumerated powers and
duties, most of which are controlled by the discretion of the
legislative body. Those eight powers and duties are as follows:
1.

Prepare a general plan

A planning commission is required to prepare a "general"
plan (formerly called a "master" plan55 ) and subsequent
amendments thereto. 56 A general plan is a comprehensive
planning document including "maps, plats, charts and descriptive and explanatory matter"57 describing how the community
proposes to meet its "present and future needs."58 The plan
may address a broad range of health, safety, and general welfare concerns,59 and may refer to territory which is not within
the city. 60 The county plan may include any part of the county.BI
A proposed general plan is adopted by the planning commission after public notice and hearing. 62 The plan adopted by
the planning commission is then "recommended" or "forwarded"
to the legislative body. 63 Mter receiving the plan and after
public hearings, the legislative body may modify and adopt the
plan or reject it. 64 Subsequent amendments follow the same
procedure. 65
The enabling acts do not explicitly require that a general
plan be adopted before the text of the zoning ordinance is
adopted. On that point a litigant in Gayland v. Salt Lake County66 asserted "that the Salt Lake County Commission cannot

55. For cities, the "master" plan was introduced in 1945 in the Municipal
Planning Enabling Act. Municipal Planning Enabling Act, ch. 23, § 2, 1945 Utah
Laws 63, 63 (repealed 1991). For counties, the "master" plan was introduced in
1941 in the original county enabling act. Zoning and Planning Commission, ch. 23,
§ 4, 1941 Utah Laws 29, 30 (repealed 1991).
56. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-204(1), -301(1) (1992), 17-27-204(1) (1992), 301(1) (Supp. 1994).
fi7. I d. §§ 10-9-302(2) (1992), 17-27 -302(2) (Supp. 1994).
58. I d. §§ 10-9-30 1(1)(a), 17-27 -301(1)(a).
59. Id. §§ 10-9-301(2)(a), 17-27 -301(2)(a).
60. ld. § 10-9-302(1)(b).
61. ld. § 17-27-302(1)(b) (Supp. 1994).
62. Id. §§ 10-9-303(1) (1992), 17-27 -303(1).
63. ld. § 10-9-303(2), 17-27-303(2).
64. I d. §§ 10-9-303(3)-(5), 17-27 -303(3)-(5).
65. ld. §§ 10-9-304 (1992), 17-27-304 (1991).
66. 358 P.2d 633 (Utah 1961).
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pass a valid zoning ordinance because it has not yet adopted a
master plan."67 Although the enabling acts then in force required the adoption of a general or "master" plan, the Utah
Supreme Court disagreed with the litigant, noting "that nowhere in the act is there any express requirement that a master plan be adopted before zoning ordinances can be passed."68
Proposed Legislative Change. A zoning ordinance is the specific implementation of the long-range forecast of a general plan.
It is thus illogical to allow adoption of a zoning ordinance
before adoption of a general plan. Both acts should be amended to require the adoption of a general plan to precede the
adoption of a zoning ordinance. 69

The enabling statutes provide that a general plan, once
adopted, is only "an advisory guide for land use decisions," 70
even though the terms of the zoning ordinance may contain a
provision "mandating compliance with the general plan."71 To
mandate compliance with the general plan means that details
of the text and map of the zoning ordinance must conform to
the plans for community development described in the general
plan. The positive side to mandating compliance is that zoning
decisions may tend to be more consistent and far-sighted because they are based, as they must be, on the terms of the
comprehensive general plan. The negative side to mandating
compliance is that litigation may increase as litigants claim,
wherever possible, that a zoning provision is invalid because it
does not "comply" with the general plan.
The explicit language in the enabling acts that a general
plan is only an "advisory guide" lays to rest the conflicting
signals sent by the Utah Supreme Court about whether a zoning ordinance must comply with a general plan. The first of
these signals is in Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 72 where the
reclassification of one-half of a city block from residential uses

67. ld. at 635.
68. ld.
69. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-404 and 17-27-404 (dealing with
temporary zoning regulations) should be amended by adding a subsection (3) which
would read as follows:
(3) Except as provided above, adoption of a zoning ordinance shall be
preceded by adoption of a general plan relating to the zoned property.
70. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-303(6)(a) (1992), 17-27-303(6)(a) (Supp. 1994).
71. ld. §§ 10-9-303(6)(b), 17-27-303(6)(b).
72. 410 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1966).
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to commercial uses was challenged on the grounds, inter alia,
that the new classification did not conform to the city's comprehensive plan which was adopted in 1927. 73 Tacitly acknowledging that the plaintiff was factually correct, the Utah Supreme Court replied:
It must be realized that zoning is not a static thing
which once established becomes set in concrete forever. To
require adherence to a plan formulated 40 years ago without
any more reason than that the ordinance had been so long
established would be quite impractical and in some instances
would frustrate attempts to put into effect necessary changes
to accomplish the objectives zoning was designed to serve. It
is obvious that there must be some pliability so that in performing its function the Commission may keep abreast of
changing conditions as life courses onward and meets the
varying needs of the growing city. 74
However, in Wilson v. Manning/ 5 a case dealing with the
use of referenda to rezone, the Utah Supreme Court, in dicta,
sent a second signal which suggested that an inconsistency
between an ordinance and a master plan might nevertheless be
a basis on which a local ordinance could be set aside:
One way to make that showing [that an ordinance should be
held invalid], under these authorities, is to demonstrate that
the amendment runs counter to the terms of or the policy
established in the underlying law or ordinance or the zoning
master plan. 16

2. Recommend a zoning ordinance
A "proposed zoning ordinance, including both the full text
of the zoning ordinance and maps . . . for zoning all or any part
of the area" within a city or county is prepared by the planning
commission and recommended to the legislative body. 77

73. ld.
74. ld.
75. 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982).
76. ld. at 254 (dicta) (emphasis added).
77. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-402(1) (1992), 17-27-402(1) (Supp. 1994); see also
id. §§ 10-9-204(2) (1992), 17-27-204(2) (1991).
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3. Administer provisions of the zoning ordinance
A planning commission may "administer provisions of the
zoning ordinance, where specifically provided for in the zoning
ordinance."78 This provision recognizes the reality that in
many, if not most, cities and counties, the planning commission
and its staff handle most zoning administration. Zoning enforcement is one example of matters which the zoning ordinance might expressly authorize a planning commission to
administer. This express authorization to administer zoning
matters legitimizes actions by a planning commission in formulating an enforcement policy, supervising enforcement officers,
and authorizing enforcement actions.

4. Recommend subdivision regulations
The acts provide that a city or county legislative body "may
enact a subdivision ordinance."79 Where this is done, "[t]he
planning commission shall . . . prepare and recommend ...
[the] proposed subdivision ordinance to the legislative body."80
The planning commission must hold a public hearing with
respect to the proposed ordinance before recommending it to
the legislative body. 81 The same process is followed for amendments to a subdivision ordinance. 82

5. Recommend approval or denial of subdivisions
In cities and counties, a subdivision plat may not be recorded unless in relation to it "a recommendation has been
received from the planning commission. "83

6. Advise the legislative body
"The planning commission shall ... advise the legislative
body on matters as the legislative body directs."84 A simple illustration of the manner in which this provision could have

78. !d. §§ 10-9-204(3) (1992), 17-27 -204(3) (1991).
79. ld. §§ 10-9-801, 17-27-801. For a dis<..'Ussion relating to subdivision ordinances, see infra text accompanying note 306.
80. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-802(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-802(1)(a) (Supp. 1994)
(emphasis added); see also id. §§ 10-9-204(4) (1992), 17-27-204(4) (1991).
81. ld. §§ 10-9-802(1)(b) (1992), 17-27-802(1)(b) (Supp. 1994).
82. ld. §§ 10-9-803 (1992), 17-27-803 (1991).
83. ld. §§ 10-9-805(1) (1992), 17-27-805(1) (Supp. 1994); see also id. §§ 10-9204(5) (1992), 17-27-204(5) (1991).
84. !d. §§ 10-9-204(6) (1992), 17-27 -204(6) (1991).
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been applied IS found in Citizen's Awareness Now v.
Marakis. 85 In this controversy, the small community of East
Carbon City was faced with a proposal to annex approximately
2,500 acres of land which would be used as "a privately owned
solid-waste disposal facility." 86 Under its power to require advice from the planning commission, the legislative body of East
Carbon City could have required its planning commission to
give advice on whether this proposal should be approved, and,
if so, under what terms.

7.

Hear and decide matters

The acts provide that "[t]he planning commission shall ...
hear or decide any matters that the legislative body designates,
including the approval or denial of, or recommendations to
approve or deny, conditional use permits."87 The power to hear
and decide should be contrasted with the power to administer.
The "hear and decide" language implies that a zoning ordinance may empower a planning commission, in ways that go
beyond simple administration, to receive public comment or
evidence and exercise discretion in making a decision. For
example, in Stucker v. Summit County, 88 the local ordinance
required a proposed use to be compatible with neighboring
uses. Where compatibility was at issue, the ordinance then
authorized the planning commission to hold hearings and make
a decision resolving the issue:
When a developer and affected property owners cannot reach
a consensus of opinion regarding compatibility of the proposed
land use, the Planning Commission holds a public hearing
prior to making a decision and listens to the concerns of all
affected property owners and interested parties regarding the
proposed project's compatibility. 89

Examples of other matters in which a planning commission
might be asked to exercise the power to "hear and decide" include nonconforming uses, 90 historic building or district sta-

85.
86.
87.
added).
88.
89.
90.

873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994).
ld. at 1119.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-204(7) (1992), 17-27-204(7) (1991) (emphasis
870 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

ld. at 285 (emphasis added).
E.g., PRovo, UTAH, PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 14.04.020(4) (1992).
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tus, 91 planned community plan approvals, 92 so-called "performance development" evaluations, 93 and, of course, conditional
use permits. 94

8. Exercise necessary and delegated powers
The provision to exercise necessary and delegated powers
is apparently intended to serve two functions. 95 First, the authorization to exercise necessary powers helps avoid a strict or
limiting construction of the enumerated powers described above
for the planning commission. 96 Second, the authorization to
exercise delegated powers accommodates the expanding tendency to delegate administrative responsibilities to planning commissions such as the responsibility to hold administrative hearings.97

F.

Miscellaneous Powers

The planning commission or its agents may enter upon
land at reasonable times to make examinations or surveys. 98
In addition, a planning commission may have access to information held by the state or any of its agencies, unless that
information is protected. 99 Cities and counties are entitled to
receive available data, information and technical services from
the state "without additional cost." 100
III.

THE ZONING ORDINANCE

The power to restrict and regulate the size and use of buildings, structures and land for trade, industry, residence and
other purposes, is granted to the legislative body of cities [and

91. E.g., id. § 14.02.100.
92. E.g., id. § 14.04.020(3).
93. Thurman v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 443 (Utah 1981); PROVO, UTAH,
PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 14.31.050 (1992).
94. E.g., PROVO, UTAH, PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 14.04.020(2) (1992).
95. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-204(8) (1992), 17-27-204(8) (1991).
96. E.g., Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(statute on appeals to the courts strictly interpreted).
97. Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). For a description in Stucker of administrative hearings, see supra text accompanying note
88.
98. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-205 (1992), 17-27-205 (Supp. 1994).
99. ld. §§ 63-2-101 to -909 (1993) (Government Records Access and Management Act).
100. ld. §§ 10-9-203(2)(b) (1992), 17-27-203(2)(b) (1991).
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counties] for the purpose of promoting the health, safety,
morals and general welfare of the community .... 101

A.

The Power to Zone

A local legislative body may adopt and amend a zoning
ordinance, 102 including both text and map. 103 Exercise of the
power to zone is an exercise of police power. The Utah Supreme
Court held in Marshall v. Salt Lake City 104 that it was the
police power that enabled a city legislative body to divide a city
into zoning districts and regulate uses therein. 105 That holding was reiterated in Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of
Logan, 106 in which the Utah Supreme Court again stated that
"[i]t is established that an owner of property holds it subject to
zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to a state's police power."to7

B.

Zoning Districts and Regulations

The legislative body "may divide the territory over which
[the city or county] has jurisdiction into zoning districts." 108
Within those districts "the legislative body may regulate and
restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair, or use of buildings and structures, and the use of
land." 109 Within each district "the regulations ... [must be]
uniform for each class or kind of buildings ... [,] but the regulations in one district may differ from those in other districts."110
In Hargraves v. Young, 111 it was held that the power to
adopt regulations within zoning districts includes the power to
designate sideyard and setback requirements. 112 By statute,

101. Walton v. Tracy Loan & Trust Co., 92 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1939).
102. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-401 to -403 (1992), 17-27-401 to -403 (Supp.
1994).
103. Id. §§ 10-9-402(1), 17-27-402(1).
104. 141 P.2d 704 (Utah 1943).
105. Id. at 707 ("[Dividing the city into zoning districts] is done under the
police power.").
106. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).
107. Id. at 390.
108. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-405(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-405(1)(a) (1991).
109. !d. §§ 10-9-405(1)(b), 17-27 -405(1)(b).
110. !d. §§ 10-9-405(2), 17-27 -405(2).
111. 280 P.2d 974 (Utah 1955).
112. Id. at 975.
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the zoning regulations may "protect and ensure access to sunlight for solar energy devices" 113 and must include regulations
permitting residential facilities for elderly and handicapped
persons. 114 With respect to different uses in zoning districts,
Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City 115 held that the
power of the legislative body to designate uses within zoning
districts includes the power to differentiate and regulate different residential uses. 116
In addition, the state's high court held in Buhler v.
Stone 117 that regulations in a zoning ordinance may include
"reasonable measures to minimize discordant, unsightly and
offensive surroundings; and to preserve the beauty as well as
the usefulness of the environment." 118 Moreover, ordinance
language requiring the elimination of "unsightly or deleterious
objects" or ')unk [and] scrap metal" 119 is not unconstitutionally vague. In relation to vagueness, the court adopted a very
broad view:
Concerning the charge of vagueness, it should be realized
that legislation must necessarily be in somewhat general
terms because it is obviously impossible to describe in detail
every act and circumstance a statute or ordinance is intended
to deal with. It is but sensible and practical that courts
should take into consideration the difficulties involved in
describing such conditions with the last degree of precision of
language. The pertinent parts of the ordinance should not be
viewed in isolation for the purpose of finding fault with them
and declaring it unconstitutional; they should be viewed in
light of the total context and purpose; and an enactment
should not be declared void for vagueness unless it is so deficient that it is susceptible of no reasonable construction which
would make it operable. 120

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 10·9-901 (1992).

See infra text accompanying note 252.
212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949).
ld. at 181.
533 P.2d 292 (Utah 1975).
ld. at 294.
Id. at 293.
ld. at 294.
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The Health, Safety, and General Welfare Standard

The traditional standard of the health, safety, and general
welfare of the public is the abstract measure of the police power by which local governments divide their territory into districts and regulate therein. 121 Although conceptually, a zoning
regulation is unenforceable if there is not a sufficient nexus
between it and the health, safety, and general welfare of community residents, 122 the Utah Supreme Court has been explicitly reluctant to invalidate a zoning regulation for this reason. This reluctance was first illustrated in Marshall in which
the Utah Supreme Court signalled the lengths it would go to
defend local zoning regulations from claims that no nexus exists.123
In Marshall, the zoning ordinance permitted "utility" business uses on intersection corners in residential districts. Acknowledging that the enabling statute required that territory
should be divided into districts and not regulated by single lots
or groups of lots, 124 the Utah Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the corner uses. 125 The basis for the holding was that
the classification was part of a comprehensive plan designed to
promote the general welfare, and the court would not second
guess the city "[u]nless the action of [the governing body of the
city] is arbitrary, discriminatory or unreasonable, or clearly
offends some provision of the constitution or statute." 126
In Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 127 a zoning provision, which prohibited residences located more than
600 feet from the University of Utah from use as a fraternity or
a sorority, was challenged on the grounds that the requirement
was discriminatory. Citing its decision in Marshall, the court
refused to invalidate the provision and noted that the power to
zone is a "discretionary power" with which the courts will not
interfere "unless the discretion is abused." 128 And, said the
court in reference to the issue of discrimination, "[t]he selection
of one method of solving the problem in preference to another

121. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-102 (1992), 17-27-102 (Supp. 1994).
122. See, e.g., Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 481 P.2d 559
(Utah 1967).
123. Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 141 P.2d 704, 711 (Utah 1943).
124. !d. at 708.
125. !d. at 711.
126. !d. at 709.
127. 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949).
128. !d. at 179.
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is entirely within the discretion of the commission; and does
not, in and of itself, evidence an abuse of discretion." 129
Again, in Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 130 the Utah Supreme Court refused to invalidate a zoning requirement because of a claimed lack of nexus between a zoning provision
and the public health, safety, and general welfare. 131 In
Dowse, the plaintiff claimed his property should be classified as
commercial and not residential. Disagreeing, the court responded that "[t]he wisdom of the plan, the necessity, the number,
nature, and boundaries of the district are matters which lie in
the discretion of the City authorities, and only if their action is
confiscatory, discriminatory or arbitrary may the court set
aside their action." 132
The same result was reached in Hargraves v. Young. 133
In Hargraves, a homeowner directly attacked the sideyard
requirements of the Salt Lake City zoning ordinance claiming
"that there is no reasonable relationship between prohibiting
such structure in sideyards [referring to a carport which offended the sideyard requirements] and the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare." 134 Implicitly recognizing that
health, safety, and general welfare was the correct standard,
the Utah Supreme Court disagreed with the homeowner and
held that the necessary nexus existed between that standard
and the sideyard requirements. 135
The one exception in this line of cases is Gibbons & Reed
Co. v. North Salt Lake City/ 36 in which the Utah Supreme
Court invalidated the rezoning of land being used as a gravel
pit. The rezoning was from a forestry and natural resource
zone to a residential zone and the court held that the rezoning
was an unreasonable exercise of the police power. 137 The
court distinguished its earlier decisions in Marshall and Dowse
on the factual grounds that the present rezoning "makes almost
useless otherwise valuable land." 138 Moreover, said the court,

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

!d. at 181.
255 P.2d 723 (Utah 1953).
!d. at 723.
!d. at 724 (citing Marshall, 141 P.2d at 704).
280 P.2d 974 (Utah 1955).
!d. at 974-75.
!d. at 975.
431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967).
!d. at 563-64.
!d. at 562.
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the rezoning presented "no real gain to the public in general"
because there was no substantial evidence that dust from the
gravel pit was a nuisance. 139
Two years later, however, the general reluctance of the
Utah Supreme Court to invalidate a zoning requirement for
lack of nexus with the public health, safety, or general welfare
explicitly reappeared in Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County. 140
In Chevron Oil, the Beaver County Commission refused to rezone property near the I-15 freeway from a grazing zone to a
highway services zone for the reasons (1) that the county did
not wish to provide government services at that location, and
(2) that new businesses by the freeway would harm established
businesses in Beaver City. 141 Citing its decision in Dowse, the
Utah Supreme Court refused to invalidate the existing zone
classification:
Whether we agree with the wisdom of the county commissioners or do not agree with it is of no importance. The
matter is to be decided by a legislative body (the county commission), and the courts do not ordinarily interfere in such
matters. However, should a board enact an ordinance which
deprives a person of his property, and where it is clear that
the board has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in a discriminating manner, the courts will grant redress. 142

Again in 1982, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated in dicta
in Wilson v. Manning 143 the proposition that zoning provisions which are irrationally connected to the health, safety, and
general welfare of community residents may be invalidated by
the courts. Thus, stated the Wilson court: "County and city
zoning ordinances can be set aside in the courts if they are
confiscatory, discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise
without basis in reason." 144 But the demonstrated reality is
that the courts will respond in such cases only where the injustice is obvious. This reality was summarized in the 1990 decision of the court of appeals in Sandy City v. Salt Lake Countyi45:

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

ld. at 563.
449 P.2d 989 (Utah 1969).
ld. at 990.
ld.
6fi7 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982).
ld. at 254 (dicta).
794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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It is well established in Utah that "courts of law cannot substitute their judgment in the area of zoning regulations for
that of the [municipality's] governing body." Instead, the
courts afford a comparatively wide latitude of discretion to
administrative bodies charged with the responsibility of zoning, as well as endowing their actions with a presumption of
correctness and validity, because of the complexity of factors
involved in the matter of zoning and the specialized knowledge of the administrative body. Thus, the courts will not
consider the wisdom, necessity, or advisability or otherwise
interfere with a zoning determination unless "it is shown that
there is no reasonable basis to justify the action taken." 146

D.

"Spot" Zones

The statutory requirement that the territory of a city or
county must be divided into districts prohibits, by definition,
the division of territory into smaller parts which are sometimes
referred to as "spot" zones. 147 In Marshall v. Salt Lake
City, 148 the Utah Supreme Court described this limitation in
the following language:
That the [enabling] statute contemplates a division and regulation by districts, instead of regulation by single lots or small
groups of lots, is evident. The regulation of the use of property
by lots or by very small areas is not zoning and does violence
to the purpose and provisions of the statute. 149

In Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral
Co., 150 the Utah Supreme Court described the consequences
of spot zoning:
Spot zoning results in the creation of two types of "islands." One type results when the zoning authority improperly limits the use which may be made of a small parcel located in the center of an unrestricted area. The second type of
"island" results when most of a large district is devoted to a
limited or restricted use, but additional uses are permitted in
one or more spots in the district. 151

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

ld. at 485-86 (citations omitted).
See generally 83 AM. JUR. 2d Zoning and Planning § 146 (1992).
141 P.2d 704 (Utah 1943).
Id. at 708 (second emphasis added).
545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976).
Id. at 1151.
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Although seemingly clear in concept about the nature and
consequences of spot zoning, the Utah Supreme Court has in
practice deferred to the discretion of local legislative bodies.152 The result is that the court has thus far been unwilling
to acknowledge the existence of a prohibited "spot" zone, even
when the zoning district is no bigger than the corner lots described in Marshall.
In cases other than Marshall, spot zone challenges have
likewise been unsuccessful. In Naylor v. Salt Lake City
Corp., 153 a zoning reclassification of one half of a city block
from residential to commercial was challenged on the grounds,
inter alia, "that the rezoning of this one-half block area for
business is in effect a 'spot' zoning inconsistent with the zoning
of the surrounding area." 154 Declining to substitute its
judgment for that of the city commission, the court made no
comment about the size of the new district and simply observed
that the reclassification was consistent with changing circumstances.155 The city commission, the court said, "must necessarily be allowed a wide latitude of discretion." 156
The result in Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n 157
was similar. In this action a long-established business, operating as a nonconforming use in a residential zone, had substantially expanded ("with annual gross receipts of more than
$1,200,000 and occupying approximately 13 acres") beyond its
original nonconforming status. 158 Rezoning of the property
from residential to commercial was challenged and "[t]he trial
court held that the reclassification ordinance constitutes spot
zoning and that the action of the Board of County Commissioners was arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious." 159 The Utah
Supreme Court reversed, holding that "[f]t is doubtful that the
term 'spot zoning' applies to this case in view of the size of the
tract." 16° Citing, among others, its decisions in Marshall,
Dowse and Naylor, the Supreme Court reiterated that zoning
classifications "lie solely within [local legislative] discretion,"

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See supra text accompanying note 146.
410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1966).
ld. at 766.
ld.
ld. at 765.
545 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1976).
ld. at 1151.
ld.
ld.
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and, in the absence of action which "is illegal, arbitrary, discriminatory or capricious," that "[i]t is the policy of this court
... that it will avoid substituting its judgment for that of the
legislative body of the municipality." 161
Thus, the result with respect to spot zones is similar to the
result with respect to the health, safety, and general welfare
standard. Although the courts have stated in concept that a
spot zone will be invalidated when challenged, the reality is
that even in the most egregious case, the court refused to invalidate the claimed spot zone. 162

E.

The Procedure to Zone

A zoning ordinance (including text and maps) is prepared
and recommended by the planning commission and adopted by
the legislative body. 163 Thereafter, amendments may not be
made to the zoning ordinance unless the proposal originated
with the planning commission or was first referred to the planning commission "for its approval, disapproval, or recommendations."164 Curiously, although the planning commission is
explicitly required to hold hearings in relation to the proposed
general plan it recommends to the legislative body, it is not
explicitly required to hold hearings in relation to the proposed
zoning ordinance it recommends to the legislative body. 165
Proposed Legislative Change. In an apparent oversight, the
enabling acts do not expressly require the planning commission to hold a hearing on a proposed zoning ordinance before
forwarding it to the legislative body. Both acts should be
amended to expressly require such a hearing. 166

161. ld. at 1152.
162. See, e.g., Marshall, 141 P.2d at 707-11.
163. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-402 (1992), 17-27-402 (Supp. 1994).
164. ld. §§ 10-9-403 (1992), 17-27-403 (1991).
16fi. Compare id. §§ 10-9-303(1), 17-27-303(1) with id. §§ 10-9-402(1), 17-27402(1).
166. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-402 and 17-27-402 (preparation and
adoption of zoning ordinance) should be amended as follows: the present subsection
(2) of said sections should be renumbered as subsection (3) and the present subsection (3) of said sections should be renumbered as subsection (4). A new subsection (2) should be enacted which provides as follows:
(2)(a) After completing a proposed zoning ordinance, the planning commission shall schedule and hold a public hearing on the proposed ordinance.
(b) The planning commission shall provide reasonable notice of the public
hearing at least 14 days before the date of the hearing.
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Preparing, amending and adopting a zoning ordinance
requires that legislative bodies first conduct public hearings.167 In Call v. City of West Jordan/ 68 the city adopted
an impact fee pursuant to its power to enact subdivision ordinances, but evidence showed that the city failed to conduct a
required public hearing first. The city argued, however, that
the public hearing requirement was satisfied "because the ordinance was adopted at a regularly scheduled city council meeting which was open to the public." 169 The Utah Supreme
Court disagreed and invalidated the impact fee ordinance:
[W]e hold that because the statute calls for a public hearing
our legislature contemplated something more than a regular
city council meeting held, so far as the record here discloses,
without specific advance notice to the public that the proposed ordinance would be considered. Notice, to be effective,
must alert the public to the nature and scope of the ordinance
that is finally adopted. Failure to strictly follow the statutory
requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it invalid. 170

Both the city and county enabling acts mandate that public
meetings held for the purpose of rezoning must be preceded by
notice thereof to the public. 171 In this context it has been held
that failure to give adequate public notice is a basis for invalidating an ordinance. For example, in Melville v. Salt Lake
County, 172 the former county enabling statute required four
public notices as a prerequisite to zoning an area for the first
time, but only one notice was given. 173 Consequently, the ordinance applying a zoning classification was held invalid. 174
In Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 175 the applicable statute
required that notice of a rezoning be given by publication in a

(c) After the public hearing, the planning commission may make changes
to the proposed zoning ordinance.
The proposed language is adapted from the notice and hearing provisions followed
by a planning commission for a general plan. !d. §§ 10-9-303(1) (1992), 17-27-303(1)
(Supp. 1994).
167. !d. §§ 10-9-402(2), 17-27 -402(2).
168. 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986).
169. Id. at 188.
170. !d. (citations omitted).
171. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-403(2) (1992), 17-27-403(2) (Supp. 1994).
172. 536 P.2d 183 (Utah 1975).
173. !d. at 134.
174. !d.
175. 487 P.2d 442 (Utah 1968).
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newspaper and "by posting in three public places designed to
give notice thereof to the persons affected." 176 The Utah Supreme Court invalidated the rezoning for lack of sufficient
public notice, even though the literal requirements of the statute (one publication and three public postings) had arguably
been met. The court was obviously influenced by the fact that
the protestors had specially inquired about the rezoning and
had been assured that it would not be adopted, and that thereafter, the applicant was personally notified of the rezoning
hearing, but the protestors were not. 177

F.

Initiative I Referendum

Article VI, section 1 of the Utah Constitution explicitly
authorizes the use of initiatives and referenda by voters "of any
legal subdivision of the state." Article VI, section 1 provides
that
[voters] under such conditions and in such manner and within
such time as may be provided by law, may initiate any desired legislation and cause the same to be submitted to a vote
of the people of said legal subdivision for approval or rejection, or may require any law or ordinance passed by the law
making body of said legal subdivision to be submitted to the
voters thereof before such law or ordinance shall take
effect. 178

In the context of local zoning legislation, the cases applying
Article VI, section 1 and the related statutes 179 are muddled.
The seminal case is Keigley v. Bench, 180 a case not dealing
with zoning, which held that some decisions, although cast in
the form of a legislative act, are in substance an administrative
decision. Following that analysis, the issuing of bonds to finance construction of a municipal electric plant and system
was held in Keigley to be legislative in nature and subject to a
referendum. 181 However, in Shriver v. Bench, 182 the setting

176. ld. at 447 (emphasis added) (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-17 (1958)
(repealed 1983)).
177. Id. at 445-46.
178. UTAH CONST. art. VI, § 1(2) (emphasis added).
179. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20A-7-401, -402 (Supp. 1994) ("Local Initiatives and
Referenda--General Provisions").
180. 89 P.2d 480 (Utah 1939).
181. ld. at 482-86.
182. 313 P.2d 475 (Utah 1957).
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of police officers' and firefighters' salaries was characterized as
administrative in nature and thus not subject to a referendum.183
Falling chronologically between Keigley and Shriver was
the first zoning case, Dewey v. Doxey-Layton Realty Co. 184 In
Dewey, the plaintiff claimed that a residential rezoning ordinance could be adopted through the initiative process. 185 His
view was plausible because in Marshall v. Salt Lake City/ 86
Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity, 187 and Dowse, 188 the court
clearly treated zoning decisions as legislative in nature. However, the Dewey court would not allow an initiative to be used to
make a zoning decision. 189 Discussing, but not explicitly
adopting the legislative/administrative test from Keigley, the
court noted that the zoning enabling statute required notice
and hearing before the adoption of zoning legislation. The court
held that, because the initiative process does not include notice
and hearing, it cannot be used to rezone. 190
Ten years after Dewey, the issue of zoning by initiative or
referendum was renewed in Bird v. Sorenson 191 in which the
plaintiffs demanded use of a referendum with respect to a rezoning. In Bird, the Utah Supreme Court issued a very brief
opinion which made no reference to its decision in Dewey but
simply cited Keigley and Shriver for the proposition that "[t]he
determinative question is whether or not the action of the City
Council was administrative or legislative." 192 The court ignored its holdings in Marshall, Phi Kappa Iota, and Dowse,
which state that the process of zoning is a legislative function, 193 and held that rezoning was administrative and refused the use of a referendum. In so holding, the Bird court

183. !d. at 480.
184. 277 P.2d 805 (Utah 1954).
185. !d. at 806.
186. 141 P.2d 704 (Utah 1943).
187. Phi Kappa Iota Frat. v. Salt Lake City, 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949).
188. Dowse v. Salt Lake City Corp., 255 P.2d 723 (Utah 1953).
189. Dewey, 277 P.2d at 809.
190. !d.
191. 394 P.2d 808 (Utah 1964).
192. !d. at 808.
193. Subsequent decisions not related to the initiative/referendum controversy
continue to treat the process of zoning and rezoning as a legislative function. See
Chevron Oil Co. v. Beaver County, 449 P.2d 989 (Utah 1969); Gibbons & Reed Co.
v. North Salt Lake City, 431 P.2d 559 (Utah 1967); Hargraves v. Young, 280 P.2d
974 (Utah 1955); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482 (Utah Ct. App.
1990).
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admitted what may have been its real concem, which was "[i]f
each change in a zoning classification were to be submitted to a
vote of the city electors, any master plan would be rendered
inoperative." 194
The holding in Bird was followed 16 years later by Wilson
v. Manning, 195 in which the plaintiffs demanded a referendum with respect to their objection to the rezoning of ten acres
of land from residential to commercial. In a 3-2 decision, based
at least in part on stare decisis grounds, the Wilson court reaffirmed its holding in Bird that a rezoning should be classified
as administrative, and, therefore, beyond the reach of the initiative/referendum statute. 196 Although offering no answer to
the challenge of the minority opinion which asked how such an
obviously legislative act like rezoning property could be
recharacterized as an administrative act, 197 the majority went
on to hold out the possibility that major rezonings could nevertheless be done by referendum:
This ruling does not mean that an amendment to a zoning ordinance can never be the subject of a referendum. Some
amendments can constitute such a material variation from
the basic zoning law of the governmental unit as to constitute, in effect, the making of a new law rather than merely,
as this Court said in Bird u. Sorenson, "implementing the
comprehensive plan and adjusting it to current conditions."198

The concession by the Wilson majority that rezonings
which constitute a "material variation" to the local zoning plan
could nevertheless be the subject of a referendum exposed the
artificiality of the "legislative/administrative" test. If rezoning
is genuinely administrative, as the majorities in Bird and Wilson hold, no amount of "material variation" to the local zoning
plan will transform the inherently administrative process of
rezoning back into a legislative process.
At the bottom of these twistings and tumings is the policy
judgment that it is not wise to trust all zoning decisions to the
popular vote. This concem is openly discussed in the most

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Bird, 394 P.2d at 808.
657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982).
ld. at 253-54.
ld. at 255.
ld. at 254.
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recent zoning case, Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis. 199 In
Marakis, the trial court disallowed the use of a referendum to
decide whether to annex approximately 2,500 acres of land into
East Carbon City, in which it would be zoned for use as a privately owned solid waste facility. 200 The Utah Supreme Court
reversed summary judgment in favor of the city and remanded
with instructions which are essentially an elaboration of its
holding in Wilson. 201 In sum, the Marakis court held that a
referendum may be used to resolve a zoning issue if two requirements related to voter participation are met. 202

1. Material change requirement
The first requirement for referendum use is the Wilson
requirement, 203 that the proposed zoning change amount to a
material change of zoning policy as opposed to the continued
administration of an existing policy. 204 If, indeed, the proposed change constitutes a material change in zoning policy,
the proposal is characterized as' legislative, 205 and, with respect to this requirement, a referendum may be used. On the
other hand, if the proposed change cannot be characterized as a
material change in zoning policy, the proposal is characterized
as administrative, 206 and a referendum may not be used.

2. Voter participation requirement
The second requirement for referendum use is the question
"whether the zoning change implicates a policy-making decision
amenable to voter control."207 The Marakis court identified
two instances where voters should not be allowed to alter zoning legislation by the use of referenda. The first instance where
voters should not participate is when "the zoning change involve[s] a matter so complex that voters should be required to
entrust the decision to their elected representatives"208 ; the
second instance is where the use of referenda will interfere
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994).
!d. at 1119, 1121.
!d. at 1121-24, 1126.
!d. at 1117.
Wilson v. Manning, 657 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah 1982).
Marakis, 873 P.2d at 1124-25.
!d. at 1125-26.
!d. at 1125.

ld.
!d.
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with the efficient operation of government. 209 "Otherwise,"
said the court, "communities will be subject to the undesirable
phenomenon of city government by referenda, an inefficient
and often arbitrary system that virtually guarantees piecemeal
land development.'>21o
Proposed Legislative Change. Whether voters should participate through initiative or referendum in the zoning process is
a fair question for debate. However, the legislative/administrative test used to regulate the issue is flawed
and should be replaced by statutory provisions which directly
regulate the issue, as permitted by Article VI, section 1 of the
Utah Constitution. 211

G.

1.

Conditional Uses

Conditional uses allowed

Both acts expressly provide that "[a] zoning ordinance may
contain provisions for conditional uses that may be allowed,
allowed with conditions, or denied in designated zoning districts, based on compliance with standards and criteria set
forth in the zoning ordinance for those uses." 212 Both acts define a conditional use; in summary form, it is a land use which
is made compatible with surrounding uses by meeting certain
conditions or requirements. 213

209. !d.
210. !d.
211. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-403 and 17-27-403 (dealing with
amendments and rezonings) should be amended by adding a new subsection (3), as
follows:
(3) Neither an initiative nor a referendum shall be used to change any
part of a zoning ordinance or a subdivision ordinance adopted pursuant to
the authority of this act, unless the following conditions are met:
(i) That the provisions at issue include a material change in zoning poli~

(ii) That the complexity of the issues involved in the proposed change is
such that they may be easily understood by the average voter in the context of an initiative or referendum.
(iii) That the initiative or referendum process will not unreasonably
interfere with the efficient operation of the governmental body.

212. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-407(1) (1992), 17-27-406(1) (1991) (emphasis
added).
213. !d. §§ 10-9-103(1)(c) (1992), 17-27-103(1)(c) (Supp. 1994).
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"Point" systems

The Utah Supreme Court has tacitly approved the use of a
numerical evaluation system to help make conditional use
decisions. In Thurston v. Cache County, 214 a numerical evaluation system was used as part of a conditional use approval
process:
The "numerical evaluation system" referred to assigns or
denies points to the application according to certain criteria.
Points are awarded for residential development which lies
closer to pre-existing development and has roadway and utility access, and are deducted for intrusions upon prime farm
land or other factors which would be of detriment to agriculture. The evaluation system is advisory in nature, and not
solely determinative of the disposition of any given application.215

3. Neighborhood approval
Concerning the decision to grant or deny conditional use
permits, the Utah Supreme Court has held that although it is
appropriate to solicit information from neighboring landowners,
it is inappropriate to base a zoning decision on their consent.
Thus, in Thurston, it was alleged that the county "placed undue reliance on objections filed by landowners in the vicinity."216 The Utah Supreme Court held the landowner's objections were properly treated by the county as advisory only.
Moreover, the court maintained:
[w]hile it is true that the consent of neighboring landowners
may not be made a criterion for the issuance or denial or [sic]
a conditional use permit, there is no impropriety in the solicitation of, or reliance upon, information which may be furnished by other landowners in the vicinity of the subject property at a public hearing. 217

However, in Davis County v. Clearfield City, 218 the Utah
Court of Appeals affirmed a district court holding that a "City
Council's decision [refusing to grant a conditional use permit]

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981).
!d. at 443.
!d. at 445.
!d.
756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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was based on 'public clamor' which was not a legally sufficient
basis for denying [a] permit."219 In a footnote, the court of appeals explained the nature of the public clamor it found objectionable: "The clamor is typified by the curious action taken at
the Planning Commission hearing, where citizens in attendance
were asked to vote on the application. Only one person voted
for the facility and all others in the audience voted against
it."220
The issue of neighborhood involvement in permit approval
arose again in Stucker v. Summit County. 221 The local zoning
ordinance allowed neighbors affected by a proposed permit to
express their opposition or support. 222 Focusing on a distinction between "neighborhood veto power and neighborhood participation,"223 the court of appeals observed:
At no time during the proceedings did the Planning Commission delegate veto power to the neighbors. Rather, it simply listened to the objections of the affected landowners and
interested parties, and then rendered a decision. Therefore,
because the Planning Commission ultimately made the decision to deny the permit, and because Thurston allows the
Planning Commission to use information gathered from
neighbors in making a decision, we hold that the 1985 Code's
absolute policy on compatibility does not impermissibly grant
veto power to the Stuckers' neighbors. 224

H.

Special Exceptions

In addition to conditional uses, both enabling acts allow
the local legislative body to "provide for special exceptions,"225
a term which is not defined in either act. The acts also cryptically provide that "[t]he legislative body may provide that conditional use permits be treated as special exceptions in the
zoning ordinance."226
Most courts have held that there is no meaningful difference between a special exception and a conditional use permit.

219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.

Id. at 711.
Id. at 711 n.9.
870 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 289-90.
Id. at 289.
ld. at 290.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-706(1)(a) (1992) (emphasis added).
Id. §§ 10-9-706(3) (1992), 17-27-706(3) (1991).
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"Different terms have been applied to ... special permits, special exceptions and conditional uses, but the consensus of judicial opinion is that they all refer to the same concept and are
therefore interchangeable."227 In the words of another commentator: ''The terms 'special permit,' 'special exception,' and
'conditional use permit' are virtually synonymous."228 On that
point, although it has not ruled directly on the issue, the Utah
Supreme Court in Thurston was willing to assume, arguendo,
that some "'special exceptions' are conditional use permits."229
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no difference between
"conditional use" and "special exception," and definitions m
both acts should be amended to reflect that reality. 230

227. 6 PATRICK J. ROHAN, ZONING AND LAND UsE CONTROLS 44.01[ 1] (1992)
(emphasis added); see, e.g., Lafayette College v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Easton, 588
A.2d 1323, 1325 (Pa. 1991) ("A special exception is a conditionally permitted use,
legislatively allowed where specific standards and conditions detailed in the ordinance are met."); Fairhope v. Fairhope, fi67 So. 2d 1353, 1355 (Ala. 1990) ("A special exception is a conditionally permitted use . . . ."); Urban Farms, Inc. v. Borough of Franklin Lakes, 431 A.2d 163, 167 (N.J. 1981) ("Rather, a special exception
or conditional use is a permitted use, subject to specific special controls and conditions."); Zylka v. City of Crystal, 167 N.W.2d 45, 48 (Minn. 1969) ("Provisions such
as the one contained in defendant city's ordinance providing for special-use permits,
sometimes called 'special exception permits' or 'conditional use permits,' were introduced into zoning ordinances as flexibility devices.").
228. Frank Schnidman & R. Lisle Baker, Planning for Platted Lands: Land
Use Remedies {or Lot Sale Subdivisions, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 545 (1983)
(emphasis added); see also 4 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING
§ 19.01 (3d ed. 19R6) ("The 'special exception,' the 'special permit,' and the use
permitted subject to administrative approval, are qualitatively the same."); Fred P.
Bosselman, The Impact of the Douglas Commission of Local Planning, C851 A.L.I.A.B.A. 433, 441 (1993) ("[T]he 'special exception' . . . has now grown to include
many types of discretionary decisions bearing such names as 'conditional uses' and
'special-use permits.'"); W. G. Roeseler, Regulating Adult Entertainment Establishments Under Conventional Zoning, 19 URB. LAW. 125, 134 (1987) ("Traditionally,
zoning ordinances distinguish between uses permitted as of right and conditional
uses, sometimes known as 'special exceptions' ... ."); Douglas A. Yanggen & Leslie
Amrhein, Groundwater Quality Regulation: Existing Governmental Authority and
Recommended Roles, 14 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 54 (1989) ("Conditional uses . . .
are referred to as 'special exception uses' in many states' zoning enabling
laws ... .").
229. Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440, 446-47 (Utah 1981).
230. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-103(c) and 17-27-103(c) (definitions) should be
amended to read as follows:
(c) "Conditional use" means a land use that, because of its unique characteristics or potential impact on the municipality, surrounding neighbors,
or adjacent land uses, may not be compatible in some areas or may be
compatible only if certain conditions are required that mitigate or eliminate the detrimental impacts. A conditional use is a type of special excep-
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Nonconforming Uses and Structures

1. Nonconforming uses and structures generally
A nonconforming use or structure is a use or structure
which legally existed under prior zoning regulations but does
not conform to present zoning regulations. 231 A nonconforming use or structure may be continued232 if it is not abandoned.233 It has been held that the burden of proving the existence of a nonconforming use falls on the person claiming
it.234
In general, the legislative body may provide for "the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration,
expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the
terms and conditions set forth in the zoning ordinance."235
However, it is a common rule that nonconforming uses cannot
be expanded and still retain their lawful status. 236 In that
context, both acts provide that "[a] nonconforming use may be
extended through the same building, provided no structural
alteration of the building is proposed or made for the purpose
of the extension."237 However, "the addition of a solar energy
device to a building is not a structural alteration."238

2.

Termination of nonconforming uses

In addition to the general power of government to terminate a nonconforming use by consent or by eminent domain, a
nonconforming use may be terminated "by providing a formula
establishing a reasonable time period during which the owner
can recover or amortize the amount of his investment in the
nonconforming use."239 Although there are no Utah cases focusing on the practice of terminating nonconforming uses by

tion.
231. UTAH CODE ANN.§§ 10-9-103(1)0)-(k) (1992), 17-27-1030)-(k) (Supp. 1994).
232. I d. §§ 10-9-408(1)(a), 17-27 -407(1)(a) (Supp. 1994).
233. Morrison v. Horne, 363 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1961).
234. ld. For a further discussion of nonconforming uses, see infra parts V.G,
VI.J.
235. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-408(2)(a), 17-27-407(2)(a) (Supp. 1994).
236. E.g., Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61, 64 (Utah 1981) (finding that
trial court did not err in holding that the defendant had unlawfully enlarged a
nonconforming use).
237. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-408(1)(1), 17-27-407(1)(1) (Supp. 1994).
238. ld. §§ 10-9-408(1)(c), 17-27-407(1)(c).
239. I d. §§ 10-9-408(2)(b), 17-27 -407(2)(b).
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amortization, the courts generally hold that reasonable amortization periods for the termination of nonconforming uses are
valid. 240 However, if the nonconforming use is in a billboard,
involuntary termination of the use may be accomplished only
through gift, purchase, agreement, exchange, or eminent domain.24I
J.

Temporary Regulations (Moratoria)

There is no provision in the acts for a moratorium on development as such, but in the case of a "compelling, countervailing public interest," the legislative body is permitted to
adopt temporary zoning regulations without a public hearing.242 These temporary regulations may operate as moratoria
because they may, for up to six months, 24a ''prohibit or regulate the erection, construction, reconstruction, or alteration of
any building or structure or subdivision approval." 244
The use of moratoria has been upheld generally. 245 But
exceptions exist where the development rights of a landowner
have vested. In Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan,246 the Utah high court held that "an applicant is entitled
to a building permit or subdivision approval if his proposed
development meets the zoning requirements in existence at the
time of his application and if he proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a compelling, countervailing public interest."247
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that if

240. See generally Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., The Reasonableness of Amortization Periods for Nonconforming Uses-Balancing the Private Interest and the Public
Welfare, 34 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 99, 109 (1988); see also Art Neon
Co. v. City & County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 121 (lOth Cir. 1973) (holding reasonable amortization scheme does not require payment of compensation); City of
Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 44 (Cal. App. 1954) (holding reasonable amortization of nonconforming uses valid and not a taking). But see PA Northwestern
Distribs., Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Moon, 584 A.2d 1372, 1376 (Pa. 1991)
("[T]he amortization and discontinuance of a lawful pre-existing nonconforming use
is per se confiscatory and violative of the Pennsylvania Constitution.").
241. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-408(2)(b) and (c), 17-27-407(2)(b) and (c) (Supp.
1994).
242. ld. §§ 10-9-404(1) (1992), 17-27-404(1).
243. [d. §§ 10-9-404(2), 17-27 -404(2).
244. ld. § l0-9-404(l)(b) (emphasis added); see also id. § 17-27-404(1)(b).
245. See, e.g., Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 35 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1963);
Mang v. County of Santa Barbara, 5 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1960).
246. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).
247. ld. at 396; see also Stucker v. Summit County, 870 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) (landowner's use rights did not vest with approval of subdivision plat).
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zoning regulations "deny a landowner all use of his property,"
even temporarily, the landowner may have a cause of action for
compensation. 248
The use of temporary regulations may focus on fast-rising
problems. That being so, it was probably intended that temporary regulations could be adopted without obtaining the recommendation of a planning commission. But the enabling acts do
not waive that recommendation249 and, indeed, are explicit
that an amendment to the text or map of a zoning ordinance
first requires referral to the planning commission. 250
Proposed Legislative Change. It was probably intended that
temporary regulations could be adopted without obtaining the
recommendation of the planning commission. Both acts
should thus be explicitly amended to provide. 251

K.

Residences for the Elderly and the Handicapped. Generally

1.

Ordinances

mu:~t

be adopted

The enabling acts provide special protection for residential
facilities for the elderly and the handicapped. Implicit in this
protection is the assumption that cities and counties, under
pressure from antagonistic residents, 252 may not voluntarily
authorize the use of these facilities. Thus, the enabling acts
provide that each city and county "shall adopt ordinances" that
permit the use of facilities for the elderly and the handicapped
which meet standards that are stated in or allowed by the
enabling acts. 253 In addition, if the zoning ordinance fails to

248. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 804, 818 (1987) ("'Temporary' takings which . . . deny a landowner all use of his property, are not different in kind from permanent takings,
for which the Constitution clearly requires compensation.").
249. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-404 (1992), 17-27-404 (Supp. 1994).
2fi0. !d. §§ 10-9-408(1)(b) (1992), 17-27-408(1)(b) (1991).
251. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-404(l)(a) and 17-27-404(l)(a) should
be amended to read as follows:
(l)(a) The legislative body may, with[~] a public hearing but without a
recommendation from the planning commission, enact ordinances establishing temporary zoning regulations for any part or all of the area within the [municipality/county] if:
252. See, e.g., Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 797 F. Supp. 918, 920 (D. Utah
1992) ("Disparaging comments [related to a facility for the handicapped were] allegedly made by residents at ... public hearings.").
258. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-502(1), -504(2) (1992), 17-27-502(1), -504(2)
(1991) (emphasis added).
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permit the facility use, the city or county must permit it on the
authority of the enabling act. 254 Moreover, the enabling acts
require that city and county ordinances "shall prohibit discrimination against elderly persons [and handicapped persons 255]
and against residential facilities for elderly persons [and handicapped persons256 ]."257

2. Review limited
The enabling acts are explicit that, in deciding to grant or
deny an application for a residential facility, a "[municipality/
county] may decide only whether or not the residential facility
. . . conforms to ordinances adopted by the [municipality/county] under this part [which addresses residential facilities]."258 Indeed, "[i]f the [municipality/county] determines
that the residential facility ... complies with the ordinances, it
shall grant the requested permit to that facility." 259

3. Elderly as a "family"
Another statutory restriction on the ability of a city or
county to limit the occupancy of residences by the elderly relates to the definition of a family used in the city or county
zoning ordinance. The enabling acts provide that "[t]he requirements of this section [facilities in single-family districts]
that a residential facility for elderly persons obtain a conditional use permit or other permit do not apply if the facility
meets the requirements of existing zoning ordinances that allow
a specified number of unrelated persons to live together."260
Thus, for example, in Provo City, a family is defined, inter alia,
as "two or more persons all related by blood within five degrees
of consanguinity, by marriage or adoption." 261 Accordingly, if
two elderly men choose to live in Provo City in a residence in a
single-family district, they meet the "family" definition, and
special qualifications related to their age status cannot be imposed.

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id. §§ 10-9-503(3), 17-27 -503(3).
ld. §§ 10-9-604(5), 17-27-604(5).
ld.

Id. §§ 10-9-504(5), 17-27 -504(5).
I d. §§ 10-9-503(1)(a), 17-27 -503(1)(a).
I d. §§ 10-9-503(1)(b), 17-27 -503(1)(b).
ld. §§ 10-9-504(6), 17-27-504(6) (emphasis added).
PROVO, UTAH, PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 14.06.020 (1993).
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L. Residential Facilities for the Elderly
1.

The facility

Residential facilities for the elderly have two components:
the facility and the elderly residents who live in the facility.
Focusing on the residence itself, four statutory standards must
be met by all residential facilities for elderly persons: (1) the facility "may not operate as a business":l 62 ; (2) the facility must
"be owned by one of the residents or by an immediate family
member of one of the residents or be a facility for which the
title has been placed in trust for a resident"263 ; (3) the facility
must "be consistent with existing zoning of the desired location"264; and, (4) the facility must "be occupied on a 24-hourper-day basis by eight or fewer elderly persons in a family-type
arrangement."265

2.

The facility as a permitted use

In all zoning districts, residential facilities for elderly persons must be a permitted use, except in zoning districts "zoned
to permit exclusively single-family dwellings," where such facilities may be a conditional use. 266 If the proposed facility is a
permitted use, meaning it is located in a zoning district which
is not limited exclusively to single-family dwellings, the local
zoning ordinance may only require compliance with the following: (1) the facility must meet all applicable zoning, health,
safety, and building codes 267 ; (2) the facility must include "adequate off-street parking space"268 ; (3) the facility must "be
capable of use as a residential facility for elderly persons without structural or landscaping alterations that would change the
structure's residential character"269 ; and, (4) the facility may
not "be established within three-quarters mile of another residential facility for elderly persons or residential facility for
handicapped persons."270

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
504(2).
267.
268.
269.
270.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-501(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-501(1)(a) (Supp. 1994).
ld. §§ 10-9-501(1)(b)(i), 17-27-501(1)(b)(i).
Id. §§ 10-9-501(1)(b)(ii), 17-27-501(1)(b)(ii).
Id. §§ 10-9-501(1)(b)(iii), 17-27-501(1)(b)(iii).
Compare id. §§ 10-9-502(1), 17-27-502(1) with id. §§ 10-9-504(2), 17-27-

ld.
!d.
!d.
!d.

§§
§§
§§
§§

10-9-502(2)(a) (1992), 17-27-502(2)(a) (1991).
10-9-502(2)(b), 17-27 -502(2)(b).
10-9-502(2)(c), 17-27 -502(2)(c).
10-9-502(2)(d), 17-27 -502(2)(d).
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The facility as a conditional use

On the other hand, if the facility will be located in a residential district which is limited exclusively to single-family
dwellings, it may be classified as a conditional use instead of a
permitted use. If the facility is allowed as a conditional use, the
following apply: (1) the facility must meet all applicable zoning,
health, safety and building codes271 ; (2) the facility must "be
capable of use as a residential facility for elderly persons without structural or landscaping alterations that would change the
structure's residential character"272 ; (3) the facility must meet
local criteria for such a residential facility for the elderly273 ;
and (4) the facility may not "be established within three-quarters mile of another residential facility for elderly persons or
residential facility for handicapped persons."274

4.

The elderly resident

The second component in residential facilities for the elderly are the elderly themselves. An "elderly" person is a person
"60 years old or older, who desires or needs to live with other
elderly persons in a group setting, but who is capable of living
independently."275 In all cases, whether the use is permitted
or conditional, two additional qualifications for the elderly residents exist: (1) "no person being treated for alcoholism or drug
abuse [may] be placed in a residential facility for elderly persons"276; and, (2) "placement in a residential facility for elderly persons [must] be on a strictly voluntary basis and not a
part of, or in lieu of, confinement, rehabilitation, or treatment
in a correctional facility." 277

M.

Residential Facilities for Handicapped Persons

1. The facility
The statutory framework for residential facilities for the
handicapped is similar in form to that for residential facilities

271. !d. §§ 10-9-504(2)(a), 17-27 -504(2)(a).
272. !d. §§ 10-9-504(2)(b), 17-27 -504(2)(b).
273. !d. §§ 10-9-504(2)(c), 17-27 -504(2)(c).
274. !d. §§ 10-9-504(3), 17-27 -504(3).
275. !d. §§ 10-9-103(1)(e) (1992), 17-27-103(1)(e) (Supp. 1994).
276. !d. §§ 10-9-502(2)(e) (1992), 17-27-502(2)(e) (1991); see also id. §§ 10-9504(1)(a), 17-27-504(l)(a).
277. !d. §§ 10-9-502(2)([), -504(1)(b), 17-27-502(2)(0, -504(1)(b).
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for the elderly. In relation to residential facilities for the handicapped, there are two components: the facility and the handicapped residents of the facility. Focusing first on the facility,
four statutory standards must be met by all residential facilities for the handicapped: (1) the facility must "be consistent
with existing zoning of the desired location"278 ; (2) the facility
must "be occupied on a 24-hour-per-day basis by eight or fewer
handicapped persons in a family-type arrangement under the
supervision of a house family or manager" 279 ; (3) the facility
must "conform to all applicable standards and requirements of
the Department of Human Services"280 ; and, (4) the facility
must "be operated by or operated under contract with [the
Department of Human Services]."281

2.

The facility as a permitted use

In all zoning districts, residential facilities for handicapped
persons must be a permitted use, except in zoning districts
"zoned to permit exclusively single-family dwellings," 282
where such facilities may be a conditional use. 283 If the proposed facility is a permitted use, meaning it is located in a
zoning district which is not limited exclusively to single-family
dwellings, the local zoning ordinance may require compliance
only with the following: (1) the facility must meet all applicable
building, safety, and health codes 284 ; (2) "the operator of the
facility [must] provide assurances that the residents of the
facility will be properly supervised on a 24-hour basis"285 ; (3)
"the operator of the facility [must] establish a municipal[!countyJ advisory committee through which all complaints
and concerns of neighbors may be addressed"28"; ( 4) "the operator of the facility [must] provide adequate off-street parking
space',.-.l87 ; (5) the facility must "be capable of use as a residential facility for handicapped persons without structural or landscaping alterations that would change the structure's residen-

278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.

§§
§§
§§
§§
§§
§§
§§
§§
§§
§§

10-9-601(1), 17-27-601(1).
10-9-601(2)(a), 17-27 -601(2)(a).
10-9-601(2)(b), 17-27-601(2)(b).
10-9-601(2)(c), 17-27-601(2)(c).
10-9-602(1), 17-27-602(1).
10-9-604(2), 17-27-604(2).
10-9-602(2)(a), 17-27 -602(2)(a).
10-9-602(2)(b), 17-27-602(2)(b).
10-9-602(2)(c). 17-27 -602(2)(c).
10-9-602(2)(d), 17-27-602(2)(d).
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tial character"288 ; and, (6) the facility may not "be established
... within three-quarters mile of another residential facility for
handicapped persons."289

3.

The facility as a conditional use

On the other hand, if the facility will be located in a residential district which is limited exclusively to single-family
dwellings, it may be classified as a conditional use instead of a
permitted use. If the facility is allowed as a conditional use, the
following apply: (1) the facility must meet all applicable health,
safety, and building codes290 ; (2) the facility must be "capable
of use as a residential facility for handicapped persons without
structural or landscaping alterations that would change the
structure's residential character"291 ; (3) the facility must meet
local criteria for such a residential facility for the handicapped292; and, (4) the facility may not "be established ...
within three-quarters mile of another residential facility for
handicapped persons."293

4.

The handicapped resident

The second component in residential facilities for the handicapped are the handicapped themselves. A handicapped person
is one who:
(i) has a severe, chronic disability attributable to a mental or
physical impairment or to a combination of mental and physical impairments, that is likely to continue indefinitely and
that results in a substantial functional limitation in three or
more of the following areas of major life activity: (A) self-care;
(B) receptive and expressive language; (C) learning; (D) mobility; (E) self-direction; (F) capacity for independent living; and
(G) economic self-sufficiency; and (ii) requires a combination
or sequence of special interdisciplinary or generic care, treatment or other services that are individually planned and
coordinated to allow the person to function in, and contribute
to, a residential neighborhood. 294

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

ld.
!d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
ld.
!d.

§§ 10-9-602(2)(e), 17-27 -602(2)(e).
§§ 10-9-602(2)(0, 17-27-602(2)(0.
§§ 10-9-604(2)(a), 17-27 -604(2)(a).
§§ 10-9-604(2)(1), 17-27-604(2)(1).
§§ 10-9-604(2)(c), 17-27 -604(2)(c).
§§ 10-9-604(3), 17-27-604(3).
§ 10-9-10:3(1)(g) (1992); see also id. § 17-27 -103(1)(g) (Supp. 1994).
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In all cases, whether the use is permitted or conditional,
there are three additional qualifications directed at handicapped residents: (1) "no person being treated for alcoholism or
drug abuse [may] be placed in a residential facility for handicapped persons"295 ; (2) "no person who is violent [may] be
placed in a residential facility for handicapped persons"296 ;
and, (3) "placement in a residential facility for handicapped
persons [shall] be on a strictly voluntary basis and not a part
of, or in lieu of, confinement, rehabilitation, or treatment in a
correctional facility." 297
IV.

SUBDIVISION REGULATION

The legislative body of any [municipality/county] may enact a
subdivision ordinance requiring that a subdivision plat comply with the provisions of the subdivision ordinance and be
approved as required by this part. 298

A. Definition of a Subdivision
In cities, a "subdivision" is comprehensively defined as any
division of land into two or more lots or parcels. 299 This same
general definition is also used in counties, except that the following are not included as a subdivision: "a bona fide division
or partition of agricultural land for agricultural purposes or of
commercial, manufacturing, or industrial land for commercial,
manufacturing, or industrial purposes."300 This difference in
definitions means that, in cities, all divisions of land into two
or more parcels are subject to the city subdivision ordinance,
even if the land will be used for agricultural, commercial, manufacturing, or industrial purposes; but, in counties, divisions of
land into two or more parcels for agricultural, commercial,
manufacturing or industrial purposes are not subject to the
county subdivision ordinance.
In counties, the exception from subdivision control for
divisions of land, ostensibly for agricultural, commercial, manufacturing or industrial purposes, is problematic. For example, if

295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

ld. §§ 10-9-604(l)(a), -602(2)(g) (1992), 17-27-604(1)(a), -602(2)(g) (1991).
ld. §§ 10-9-604(1)(b), -602(2)(h), 17-27-604(1)(b), -602(2)(h).

Id. §§ 10-9-602(2)(i), -604(1)(c), 17-27 -602(2)(i), -604(1)(c).
ld. §§ 10-9-801, 17-27-801.
ld. §§ l0-9-103{1)(q) (1992), 17-27-103(1)(q) (Supp. 1994).
ld. § 17-27-103(1)(q)(iii) (emphasis added).
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the local zoning ordinance provides no further definition on
what constitutes a "bona fide" division of land for agricultural
purposes, zoning officials may be hard pressed to enforce any
minimum acreage requirement. 301 In addition, even when the
zoning ordinance does provide a minimum acreage standard,
those standards may vary widely. For example, a zoning regulation described in Thurston v. Cache County 302 imposed a 1Dacre minimum for agricultural parcels, while a zoning regulation described in Morgan County v. Stephens 303 imposed a
100-acre minimum. 304
A rational basis exists for exempting divisions of relatively
large parcels of agricultural land from the control of county
subdivision ordinances because continued use of land for genuinely agricultural purposes does not normally create new land
use problems. But that is not true for commercial, manufacturing, industrial land, or agricultural land in relatively small
parcels, because land divided for such purposes is likely to create needs in relation to transportation, sewer, water, power,
and the like. It follows that subdivisions of land which are
likely to create such needs should be required to respond to the
county zoning ordinance.
Proposed Legislative Change. Divisions of land for commercial, manufacturing, or industrial purposes, or into relatively
small parcels for agricultural purposes will normally generate
increased demands related to transportation, sewer, water,
power, and the like. The county act should be amended to
make such divisions of land subject to a county subdivision
ordinance. 305

301. For example, as a legal advisor to county zoning officials, the author was
asked for opinions describing how small certain parcels of land could be and still
be for "bona fide agricultural purposes" if a division of land was for a "trout farm,"
or in another case, a "hydroponic farm."
302. 626 P.2d 440, 442 (Utah 1981).
303. 520 P.2d 1340, 1340 (Utah 1974).
304. An issue raised but not resolved in Morgan County is whether the statutory exemption from subdivision ordinance control of divisions of land for bona fide
agricultural purposes preempted legislative attempts by a county to define the
minimum size of bona fide agricultural parcels. Under the new county act, however, it may be argued that the provisions of§ 17-27-104(1) eliminate the preemption
issue by expressly permitting the zoning ordinance to impose a stricter standard in
the form of minimum parcel sizes.
305. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-103(1)(q)(iii) (definitions) should be
amended as follows:
(iii) "Subdivision" does not include a bona fide division or partition of agricultural land for agricultural purposes [oF of eemmereial, manafaeturing,
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B. Enactment of a Subdivision Ordinance
A proposed subdivision ordinance is prepared by the planning commission, then recommended to and enacted by the
legislative body. 306 Each of those bodies must hold public
hearings after giving public notice. 307 Amendments to the
subdivision ordinance follow the same procedure. 308

C.

Content of a Subdivision Ordinance

Although both enabling acts empower city and county
legislative bodies to enact a "subdivision ordinance," neither act
mandates what such an ordinance shall or shall not include. In
practice, however, a typical subdivision ordinance may include
the following regulations: (1) subdividing procedures; (2) plat
requirements; (3) street and easement requirements; (4) building lot requirements; (5) grading and slope requirements; and,
(6) compliance with subdivision-related exactions. 309
A variety of exactions 310 will often be included in, or associated with, a subdivision ordinance, consisting of connection
fees, 311 impact fees, 312 dedications of land, 313 and fees in
lieu of dedications of land,314 each of which is discussed below. With regard to enforcement, this association of exactions
with plat approval is a matter of administrative convenience
because zoning ordinances may make compliance with the
exactions a condition of plat approval. 31 s

eF iHaastFial laml ieF eemmeFeial, manufaettiFiHg, eF iHaustFial IJUFIJeses].
Provided, however, that a division or partition of land resulting in one or
more parcels of land which is less than 25 acres in size is a subdivision.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-402(1) (1992), 17-27-402(1) (Supp. 1994).
ld. §§ 10-9-802, 17-27-802.
Id. §§ 10-9-803(2) (1992), 17-27 -803(2) (1991).
See, e.g., PROVO, UTAH, PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 15.01 (1993).
See generally Michael J. Mazuran, Evolution of Real Estate Development
Exactions in Utah, UTAH BAR J., Aug.-Sept. 1990, at 11.
311. See generally PROVO, UTAH, PROVO CITY ORDINANCES § 10.03.250 (1993).
312. See generally Brian W. Blaesser & Christine M. Kentopp, Impact Fees:
The "Second Generation," 38 J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 55 (1990).
313. Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 217, 218 (Utah 1979) (ordinance
required subdividers to dedicate land or pay fees in lieu of dedications).
314. ld.
315. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-801 (1992), 17-27-801 (1991).
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1. Connection fees
The Utah courts have approved the collection of sewer and
water connection fees as part of the process of approving subdivision plats. Specifically, in Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo
City, 316 the Utah Supreme Court held that a city may charge
a reasonable sewer connection fee for the purpose of enlarging
and improving a sewer system. 317 In Banberry Development
Corp. v. South Jordan City, 318 payment of sewer and water
connection fees was required as a condition to final subdivision
plat approval. However, the court imposed a seven-part test to
ensure that "newly developed properties" do not "bear more
than their equitable share of the capital costs in relation to
benefits conferred."319 Thus, in Patterson v. Alpine City, 320 a
connection fee schedule with incentives for early payment was
invalidated because the incentive amounts were not reasonably
connected to the cost of constructing, maintaining, and operating the subject sewer system. 321

2. Impact fees
The Utah Supreme Court has validated the collection of
impact fees through the subdivision approval process, so long
as there is a relationship between the fees and the subdivision.
In 1979 in Call v. City of West Jordan, 322 the first of three
opinions by the same name, the court approved as a valid exercise of police power an exaction "which requires that
subdividers dedicate 7 percent of the land to the city, or pay
the equivalent of that value in cash, to be used for flood control
and/or parks and recreation facilities." 323 In the second of the
three Call opinions, 324 the court on rehearing augmented its
first decision by requiring that the development must generate
the needs on which the land/fee exaction is based and that, in

316. 503 P.2d 451 (Utah 1972).
317. ld.; see also Rupp v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338 (Utah 1980) (validating increased sewer fees to pay all capital costs of sewer system).
318. 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981).
319. Id. at 903; see Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 (Utah 1982) (noting
case remanded to take evidence ensuring compliance with the seven-part Banberry
test).
320. 663 P.2d 95 (Utah 1983).
321. !d. at 97.
322. 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979).
323. !d. at 218.
324. 614 P.2d 1257 (Utah 1980).
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response, the land/fee exaction must be used to benefit the
subdivision. 325

3. Dedications of land
The first two Call decisions upheld subdivision related
requirements for the payment of a fee or a dedication of land.
Those decisions are thus a precedent for land dedications as a
precondition to subdivision approval. However, a 1987 United
States Supreme Court decision, Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission, 326 emphasized, as do the Call decisions, that the
dedication of land cannot be required unless there is a nexus
between the required dedication and the burdens created by
the proposed development. The holding in Nollan was reemphasized in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 327 in which the nation's
high Court stressed that there must be a "reasonable relationship" between the nature and extent of the impact of the development and the land dedication that was demanded. 328

D. Approval of Subdivision Plats
A county recorder cannot "file or record" a subdivision plat
until it has been approved by the city or county legislative body
or by an official designated by ordinance. Neither the legislative body nor an official designated by the legislative body may
approve a subdivision plat until the planning commission gives
its recommendation. 329

1.

Council-mayor form of government

The rule above, that the legislative body may approve a
subdivision plat, may not apply to cities operating under an optional council-mayor form of govemment. This conclusion grows
out of the decision of the court of appeals in Salt Lake County
Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Sandy City. 330 In Sandy City,
the issue was whether the municipal council (operating under a

325. ld. at 1259.
326. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
327. 114 S. Ct. 2309, 2319 (1994).
328. ld. at 2319 (endorsing the "reasonable relationship" test of many state
courts but declining to adopt the test formally because of semantics. "We think a
term such as 'rough proportionality' best encapsulates what we hold to be the
requirement of the Fifth Amendment.").
329. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-805(1) (1992), 17-27-805 (Supp. 1994).
330. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
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council-mayor form of government) could authorize itself-and
not the board of adjustment-to act as an appellate body with
respect to conditional use permit approvals. On the face of
things, it appeared that the municipal council could exercise
that authority because the applicable statute provided that the
board of adjustment would make such decisions, "unless the
legislative body of the municipality by ordinance has designated another body as the appellate body for those matters."331
But the court of appeals disagreed with the Sandy City
procedure on separation of powers grounds. Citing Martindale
v. Anderson, 332 which held that the council-mayor form of
government "is a true separation of powers form of government,"333 and Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp. ,3 :34 which
held that "the authority to resolve zoning disputes is properly
an executive function rather than a legislative one,"335 the
court of appeals held that the municipal council could not authorize itself to hear conditional use permit appeals. 336
The reasoning in Sandy City seems to apply to the approval of subdivision plats. Although section 10-3-1219.5 provides
that "the council [in a council-mayor form of government] shall,
by ordinance, provide for the manner in which ... subdivisions
... are approved, disapproved or otherwise regulated," 0 :J 7 it is
nevertheless true, as held in Martindale v. Anderson, that the
approval of subdivision plats is "a function of the executive
branch."338 Thus, a municipal council, in an optional councilmayor form of government, may provide for the manner in
which subdivision plats will be approved, as long as it does not
authorize itself to perform that function in violation of separation of powers principles.

331. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-8 (1953) (repealed 1991). This provision was recodified in 1991 in a slightly different form (not changing the substance of the
provision). UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-704(2) (1992); see Salt Lake County Cottonwood
Sanitary Dist., 879 P.2d at 1383 & n.5.
332. 581 P.2d 1022 (Utah 1978).
333. !d. at 1027.
334. 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988).
335. !d. at 899.
336. !d. at 901.
337. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-3-1219.5 (1992).
338. Martindn.le, 581 P.2d at 1028 (emphasis added).
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General principles

Where the zoning ordinance gives the city council (in cities
not operating under an optional council-mayor form of government) the power to approve a subdivision plat, the Utah Supreme Court in Wright Development v. City of Wellsville 339
held that "approvals" by the city engineer and the planning
commission are advisory only, and mandamus will not lie to
compel the city council to approve a plat. 340 Moreover, the
courts will not interfere with the decision to approve or not to
approve a subdivision plat "unless the determination made is
in violation of substantial rights, or is so totally discordant to
reason and justice that its action must be deemed capricious
and arbitrary."341 In addition, by statute the legislative body
may refuse to approve a subdivision plan or plat that fails to
make adequate provision for solar energy devices. 342

3. Approvals
The refusal to approve a subdivision plat cannot be capricious or arbitrary. Utah's high court in Western Land Equities,
Inc. v. City of Logan 343 held that an applicant was entitled to
a building permit or subdivision approval based on zoning
existing at the time of the application unless there was a "compelling, countervailing public interest" to the contrary, or unless at the time of the application the city or county had initiated zone changes. 344 Once a subdivision plat has been approved, the court held in Wood v. North Salt Lake 345 on due
process grounds that a city cannot by ordinance unilaterally
demand amendments to the plat and refuse to issue building
permits until there is compliance with those amendments. 346

E. Amendment of Subdivision Plats
The enabling acts provide a statutory mechanism by which
an established subdivision plat may be amended for "good

339. 608 P.2d 232 (Utah 1980).
340. !d. at 233.
341. !d. at 234.
342. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-901(2) (1992).
343. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980). For a discussion of "vested" rights, see infra
part V.M.
344. Western Land Equities, 617 P.2d at 396.
345. 390 P.2d 85R (Utah 1964).
346. !d. at R60.
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cause"347 after notice. 348 This provision in the new enabling
acts cures a problem under the old subdivision statutes which
did not provide a practical mechanism for plat amendment. 349
The lack of a statutory amendment process may have been the
cause of attempts, such as the one in Wood, 350 in which the
city attempted to effectively "amend" a plat by ordinance and
not by plat amendment procedures.

F.

Official Map

Somewhat related to subdivision plats and exactions associated with the approval and filing of subdivision plats is the
"official map." An official map should not be confused with the
map which accompanies the text of the zoning ordinance and
shows the zoning classification (e.g., residential, commercial,
industrial, etc.) which applies to land in a city or a county.
Prior to 1991, the city and county enabling acts contemplated the adoption of an official map in addition to the adoption of a master plan. 351 The official map showed the location
of existing and future roads. Without a formal "taking'' (or the
payment of compensation), the pre-1991 acts empowered a
legislative body to place significant restraints on the development of land over which it proposed to build a road. 352 The
Utah State Legislature had this "official [road] map"353 in
mind when it enacted both the city act and the county act in
1991. 354
Keeping in mind the distinction between an official map
and the zoning map, the code now provides that cities and
counties "may not adopt an official map."355 Moreover, "[a]n
official map adopted under the previous [city or county] enabling statute" cannot be used to compel a landowner to dedicate land or to compel a city or county to acquire land. 356 To

347. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-810 (1992), 17-27-810 (1991).
348. !d. §§ 10-9-809, 17-27-809.
349. !d. § 57-5-7 (1953) (repealed 1991) (holding that the application to amend
a subdivision plat required approval of all owners of land in the plat and the
owners of land along streets associated with the plat).
350. 390 P.2d 858, 858 (Utah 1964).
351. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-23, 17-27-7 (1953) (repealed 1991).
352. !d.
353. Compare id. §§ 10-9-24, 17-27-7 (1953) (repealed 1991) with id. §§ 10-9306(2)(a) and (3) (1992), 17-27-306(2)(a) and (3) (Supp. 1994).
354. !d.
355. !d. §§ 10-9-306(1) (1992), 17-27-306(1) (Supp. 1994).
356. !d. §§ 10-9-306(2)(a), 17-27 -306(2)(a).
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avoid any misunderstanding, the 1991 enabling acts explicitly
provide that "[a]n official map may not be used to unconstitutionally prohibit the development of property designated for
eventual use as a public street."357

V. ZONING ENFORCEMENT
A [municipality/county] or any owner of real estate within the
[municipality/county J ... may, in addition to other remedies
provided by law, institute ... injunctions, mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate actions ... [or] proceedings to
prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the unlawful building, use,
or act. 358

A.

Government Enforcement

Cities and counties may initiate civil actions to enforce the
zoning enabling acts, and ordinances adopted pursuant thereto,
"in addition to other remedies provided by law."359 These legal actions may include the following remedies: (1) "injunctions,
mandamus, abatement, or any other appropriate actions"360 ;
or, (2) "proceedings to prevent, enjoin, abate, or remove the
unlawful building, use or act."361

B.

Injunction by Government

Historically, a civil remedy commonly sought by cities and
counties has been an injunction: Provo City v. Claudin 362 was
a successful claim for an injunction preventing the establishment of a funeral home in a residential district; Clinton City v.
Patterson 363 was an unsuccessful claim for an injunction preventing the use of land as a livestock feedlot; Morgan County v.
Stephens 364 was a successful claim for an injunction preventing the sale of unsubdivided land for nonagricultural purposes;
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner 365 was an unsuccessful claim

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

ld.
I d.
ld.
I d.
ld.

§§
§§
§§
§§

10-9-306(3), 17-27-306(3).
10-9-1002(1)(a)(i), (ii) (1992), 17-27 -1002(1)(a)(i), (ii) (1991).
10-9-1002(1)(a), 17-27-1002(1)(a).
10-9-1002(1)(a)(i), 17-27 -l002(1)(a)(i).
§§ 10-9-1002(1)(a)(ii), 17-27-1002(1)(a)(ii).
63 P.2d 570 (Utah 1936).
433 P.2d 7 (Utah 1967).
520 P.2d 1340 (Utah 1974).
552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976).
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for a mandatory injunction compelling the removal of a carport;

Fillrrwre City v. Reeve 366 was an unsuccessful claim to abate
and enjoin the keeping of pigs, cattle, and horses; Utah County
v. Young 367 was a successful claim to enjoin a commercial use
in an agricultural district; and, Utah County v. Baxter368 was
a successful claim for an injunction to prevent a commercial
use in a noncommercial zone.
In Baxter, the Utah Supreme Court explained the policy
that allows a local government to obtain an injunction to prohibit violation of its zoning laws:
Generally, injunctive relief is available only when intervention of a court of equity is essential to protect against "irreparable injury"; hence, where the remedy at law is adequate, an
injunction will not lie. Under our zoning statute, however,
injunctive relief is available as an alternative to criminal
prosecution. This is based on the assumption that zoning
offenses are inherently different from other violations of law,
and that enforcement officers should be empowered to seek
civil redress rather than to proceed in every case by criminal
prosecution. 369
In Baxter, the court quoted City of New Orleans v. Liberty
Shop, 370 explaining the public interests that an injunction is
intended to protect:
An injunction should not be issued to prevent the commission

of a crime, if the only reason for preventing it is that it is a
crime. However, if the wrong complained of is injurious to
property interests or civil rights, or if it is a public nuisance,
either in the opinion of the court or in virtue of a statute or
an ordinance making it a nuisance, the fact that it is also a
violation of a criminal statute or ordinance does not take
away the authority of a court of civil jurisdiction to prevent
the injury or abate the nuisance. 371

366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.

571 P.2d 1816 (Utah 1977).
615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980).
635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981).
lei. at 64.
101 So. 798 (La. 1924).
lei. at 798, quoted in Baxter, 635 P.2d at 64.
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Presumption of Validity

Administrative actions granting or denying permission to
engage in a land use are presumed to be valid. In Cottonwood
Heights Citizens Ass'n v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake
County, 372 a county commission authorized construction of an
apartment complex after having denied that permission to a
previous owner. Sustaining the action of the county commission, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Due to the complexity of factors involved in the matter of
zoning, as in other fields where courts review the actions of
administrative bodies, it should be assumed that those
charged with that responsibility (the Commission) have specialized knowledge in that field. Accordingly, they should be
allowed a comparatively wide latitude of discretion; and their
actions endowed with a presumption of correctness and validity which the courts should not interfere with unless it is
shown that there is no reasonable basis to justify the action
taken. 373

Notwithstanding a general assumption of validity, an action by government to enforce an ordinance may be defeated by
a showing that adoption of the ordinance did not meet procedural requirements. 374

D.

Defenses

If local government initiates legal action to enforce its
zoning ordinance, the defendant may respond by raising a
number of issues which, in a loose sense, may be classified as
"defenses." The list of such defenses includes: (1) a claim that
the zoning authority has lost the legal right to enforce its ordinances because of simple delay, which may be incorporated in a
formal claim of laches 375 ; (2) a claim that the zoning authority has engaged in an act or omission which estops it from enforcing its zoning ordinance376 ; or, (3) a claim that the subject
use is a lawful nonconforming use. 377
372.
373.
374.
strictly
valid.").
375.
376.
377.

593 P.2d 138 (Utah 1979).
ld. at 140.
Call v. City of W. Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183 (Utah 1986) ("Failure to
follow the statutory requirements in enacting the ordinance renders it in-

See discussion infra part V.E.
See discussion infra part V.F.
See discussion infra part V.G.
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Inaction I Laches

The Utah Supreme Court in Salt Lake County v.
Kartchner378 held that "[o]rdinarily a municipality is not precluded from enforcing its zoning regulations, when its officers
have remained inactive in the face of ... violations."379 However, in Kartchner, inaction nevertheless precluded a county
from enforcing a setback requirement where its inaction in
relation to several other homeowners had become discriminatory.380 Later, the court in Provo City v. Hansen 381 held it was
permissible for a city or county to use a complaint system in
which an enforcement action is initiated when prompted by a
citizen complaint, so long as the result is not discriminatory.382 If the defendant claims laches, the court in Baxter
maintained, "laches is a defense which must be affirmatively
pleaded."383

F.

Estoppel

Estoppel is a defense sometimes raised by a defendant in
an attempt to prevent a city or county from enforcing its zoning
ordinance. In six cases the Utah courts have commented on the
use of estoppel in opposition to a zoning enforcement action.

1. Estoppel cases
In Morrison v. Horne, 384 the plaintiff claimed the right to
construct a service station in a residential district, in part because the county assessor had incorrectly "listed and assessed
it as commercial property."385 Refusing the plaintiff's estoppel
claim, the Utah Supreme Court outlined its philosophy with
respect to such claims:
As to estoppel: It would be unreasonable and unrealistic
to conclude that a clerk or a ministerial officer having no
authority to do so, could bind the county to a variation of a

378. 552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976).
379. !d. at 138.
380. !d. at 140.
381. 585 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978).
382. !d. at 462.
383. Utah County v. Baxter, 635 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah 1981). The court reiterated, "[t]he defense was never asserted in defendant's answer nor at trial, and hence,
we do not address it on appeal." !d.
384. 363 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1961).
385. !d. at 1113.
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zoning ordinance duly passed, to which everyone has notice
by its passage and publication, because a ministerial
employee erred in characterizing the type of property. 386

Nevertheless, in Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 387 the
Utah Supreme Court approved the use of estoppel under circumstances where a carport was ten feet in violation of a 30foot front yard setback. Noting "at least six similar violations of
the setback ordinance within the vicinity of defendant's property,''ass the Utah Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
held the county was estopped from enforcing the setback because of "[t]he discriminatory manner in which the ordinance
has been enforced."389 But shortly thereafter, in Provo City v.
Hansen, 390 the court was faced with a law student who rented
his house to as many as eleven other single students in violation of occupancy requirements. The student claimed he was
justified under Kartchner because other unresolved occupancy
violations existed in the vicinity. The Utah Supreme Court held
that "no discriminatory enforcement" had been proved by the
defendant because "the record is clear that a zoning violation
complaint triggered enforcement action in every case discussed
at trial."391
In Utah County v. Young, 392 the trial court granted an
injunction preventing the defendant from conducting a commercial auction business in an agricultural zone. The defendant
cited Kartchner and claimed that the county was estopped
because the county building inspector, noting plumbing and
wiring suitable for a commercial building, did not warn the
defendant that a commercial use would be unlawful in his new
building. 39a Contrary to the defendant's position, an advisory
jury found that the defendant knew, when he obtained his
building permit, that current zoning prohibited commercial
uses. 394 The court concluded that the defendant acted with
knowledge of the zoning restrictions and was not misled by the
building inspector, and "as a matter of law, estoppel may not

3R6.
387.
3R8.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.
394.

!d. at 1114.
552 P.2d 136 (Utah 1976).

!d. at 140.
!d.
5R5 P.2d 461 (Utah 1978).

!d. at 463.
615 P.2d 1265 (Utah 1980).

!d. at 1266.
!d.
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be used as [a] defense by one who has acted fraudulently, or in
bad faith, or with knowledge."395
In Utah County v. Baxter, 396 the defendant expanded a
nonconforming use from one building to two buildings and
thereafter claimed that the county had acquiesced in her action
by issuing certain permits. The record was ambiguous about
the extent to which county personnel knew of the expanded
uses, but the court nevertheless denied the claim of estoppel
because the defendant admitted she had "[not] been misled by
the county or its employees."397
In Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 398 the defendant
claimed, inter alia, that Alta was estopped from enforcing a
single-family residential classification which would prohibit its
commercial lodging operation. On three occasions after construction of the subject residence, the town clerk erroneously
issued the defendant a business license to operate a "lodging
facility," and it was this conduct that was the basis of the estoppel claim. 399 However, factually, it was clear that the residence was constructed before the business licenses were issued,
so the court of appeals concluded the defendant "[had] shown
neither an act or omission by Alta justifying good faith reliance
nor a substantial detrimental change in [defendant's) position
in reliance on Alta's acts."400 Moreover, "failure to enforce
zoning for a time does not forfeit the power to enforce."401

2. Estoppel principles
In the aforementioned estoppel claims, only Kartchner was
successful. But the decision in that case may be limited to its
facts because the opinion does not articulate its controlling
principles. Indeed, since Kartchner, Utah's high court has been
unwilling to recognize a similar situation even though, under
similar facts, it had the chance two years later in Hansen.
Instead, the court has established criteria for an estoppel claim
which make it debatable whether Kartchner will be repeated.

395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.

!d. at 1267.
635 P.2d 61 (Utah 1981).

!d. at 65.
836 P.2d 797 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).

!d. at 800.
!d. at 803.
!d.
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The following discussion delineates the controlling principles
established by the court.
a. Exceptional circumstances. "Estoppel, waiver or
laches ordinarily do not constitute a defense to a suit for injunctive relief against alleged violations of the zoning laws,
unless the circumstances are exceptional. "402
b. Act or omission. To invoke estoppel there must be
"an act or omission upon which [the defendant] could rely in
good faith in making substantial changes in position or incurring extensive expenses."403
c. An act. If the claimed estoppel is based upon
reliance on an affirmative act by the zoning authority, "[ t]he
action ... must be of a clear, definite and affirmative nature."404
d. An omission. If the claimed estoppel is based
upon reliance on an omission by the zoning authority, "omission means a negligent or culpable omission where the party
failing to act was under a duty to do so. Silence or inaction will
not operate to work an estoppel."405
e. Reliance. "The focus of zoning estoppel is primarily upon the conduct and interests of the property owner. The
main inquiry is whether there has been substantial reliance by
the owner on governmental actions."406 In the context of reliance: (a) the claiming party "has a duty to inquire and confer
with the local zoning authority regarding the uses of the property that would be permitted"407 ; and, (b) "as a matter of law,
estoppel may not be used as [a] defense by one who has acted
fraudulently, or in bad faith, or with knowledge."408

402. 8A EUGENE McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 21i.349 (rev. vol.
1965), quoted in Kartchner, li52 P.2d at 138; see also Ben Hame Corp., 8:36 P.2d at
803; Young, 615 P.2d at 1267 ("In Kartchner, this court ruled that. under exceptional circumstances, estoppel, waiver, or laches may constitute a defense to a suit for
relief against alleged violations of zoning laws.")
403. Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d at 803; Younp, 615 P.2d at 1267.
404. Young, 615 P.2d at 1267; see also Ben Harne Corp., R36 P.2d at 803.
405. Young, 615 P.2d at 1267-68; see also Ben Harne Corp., 836 P.2d at R03.
406. Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 391 (Utah
1980) (emphasis added).
407. Young, 615 P.2d at 1268.
408. !d. at 1267.

1]

UTAH ZONING LAW
G.

57

Nonconforming Use

In a zoning enforcement action a defendant may defend by
claiming that his or her use may continue as a lawful nonconforming use. 409 The Utah Supreme Court held in Morrison v.
Horne 410 that this burden is on the claimant. 411 But if the
claimant succeeds in proving the existence of the nonconforming use, the court held in Fillmore City v. Reeve 412 that "when
the non-conforming use is established, the burden of proof is reversed. It is then on the city to prove that the defendant violated the zoning ordinance by exceeding his established non-conforming use."413

H.

Private Actions

In contrast to civil enforcement actions brought by cities
and counties, there are more than thirty reported Utah cases in
which private parties have brought suit against government or
other private parties in relation to zoning issues. The enabling
acts expressly empower cities and counties to withhold building
permits as a means of enforcing their zoning ordinances. 414
Historically, the exercise of this power has meant that the
remedy most commonly sought by private plaintiffs is a writ of
mandamus. 415 By means of this remedy, private parties have
sought court orders compelling government officials to issue
building permits, 416 approve subdivision plats,417 or approve
conditional use permits. 418

409. For a further discussion of nonconforming uses, see supra part III.I; infra
part VI.J.
410. 363 P.2d 1113 (Utah 1961).
411. ld. at 1114; see also Fillmore City v. Reeve, 571 P.2d 1316, 1318 (Utah
1977); State v. Holt's Estate, 381 P.2d 724, 725 (Utah 1963) ("In that case [Morri·
son v. Horne], we determined that the burden of proving the right to a non-conforming use of property . . . was on the property owner.").
412. 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977).
413. ld. at 1318.
414. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1002(2) (1992), 17-27-1002(2) (1991).
415. See discussion infra part V.I.
416. See discussion infra part V.I.
417. See discussion infra part V.I.
41R. See discussion infra part V.I.
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Mandamus

1. Mandamus cases
Utah's courts have handed down several decisions in which
private parties have attempted to employ a writ of mandamus:
in Morrison v. Horne, 419 the Utah Supreme Court refused
mandamus to issue a building permit for a service station because a claimed nonconforming use could not be proved; in
Wood v. North Salt Lake, 420 mandamus compelling the issuance of a building permit was granted in the face of a city demand that an existing subdivision plat should be amended; in
Crist v. Mapleton City, 421 mandamus to issue a building permit was refused because the correct remedy was an appeal
(and not mandamus); in Crist v. Bishop, 422 mandamus compelled the issuance of a permit on the grounds that use of the
word "school" in the zoning ordinance text included a residential school for troubled boys; in Herr v. Salt Lake County, 423
mandamus compelled the issuance of a conditional use permit
because the county commission did not act to reverse a decision
of the planning commission within the time provided in the
zoning ordinance; in Seal v. Mapleton City, 424 mandamus
compelling the approval of a proposed subdivision plat was
refused because the decision was within the reasonable discretion of the city; and, in Wright Development, Inc. v. City of
Wellsville, 42s a developer was likewise refused mandamus
compelling approval of a proposed subdivision plat because that
decision was within the reasonable discretion of the city.
Additionally, in Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan,426 the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to an order requiring Logan to approve a subdivision plat because its
right thereto had vested; in Levie v. Sevier County, 427 a subdivider was refused mandamus compelling the approval of a
subdivision plat because he failed to exhaust his administrative

419.
420.
421.
422.
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.

363
390
497
520
525
598
608
617
617

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

1113 (Utah 1961).
858 (Utah 1964).
633 (Utah 1972).
196 (Utah 1974).
728 (Utah 1974).
1346 (Utah 1979).
232 (Utah 1980).
388 (Utah 1980).
331 (Utah 1980).
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remedies; in Thurston u. Cache County, 428 mandamus compelling the approval of a conditional use permit was refused because the matter was within the discretion of the county planning commission; in Wilson u. Manning, 429 mandamus to compel application of the initiative process to rezoning ordinances
was denied; in Merrihew u. Salt Lake County Planning and
Zoning Commission, 430 an order of the trial court granting
mandamus compelling the issuance of a building permit was
reversed because the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; in Hatch u. Utah County Planning Department,431 extraordinary relief compelling the issuance of a
building permit was likewise refused because the plaintiff had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; in Scherbel u.
Salt Lake City Corp., 432 mandamus to approve a condominium project was refused because the board of adjustment (in a
council-mayor form of government) did not make the final administrative decision to deny the project; in Davis County u.
Clearfield City, 433 an extraordinary writ (mandamus) was issued, compelling the approval of a conditional use permit which
the city had arbitrarily and capriciously denied; and in Salt
Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District u. Sandy City, 434
an extraordinary writ (mandamus) was granted to compel the
issuance of a conditional use permit because the city council (in
a council-mayor form of government) improperly reserved to
itself the power to hear conditional use appeals.

2. Mandamus principles
The holdings in the foregoing mandamus actions may be
summarized as follows:
a. Mandamus as a substitute for an appeal. Mandamus may not be used as a substitute for an appeal; moreover, if mandamus is improperly substituted for an
appeal, 435 the action will be dismissed for failure to exhaust

428. 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981).
429. 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982).
430. 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983).
431. 685 P.2d 550 (Utah 1984).
432. 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988).
433. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
434. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
435. See generally Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah 1988);
Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633 (Utah 1972). For a further discussion of mandamus as a substitute for an appeal, see infra part VII.G.
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administrative remedies. 436 On the other hand, nothing in
these holdings prevents the use of mandamus, in association
with an appeal, for the purpose of compelling official action if
an appeal is resolved in favor of the appellant. 437
b. Mandamus versus local discretion. The courts will
not substitute their judgment for that of government officials
and compel the approval of building permits, subdivision plats,
or conditional use permits, so long as there is a reasonable
factual basis for the local decision. 438 But if there is not a reasonable factual basis for the local decision, or if it is based on
unacceptable criteria, the courts will use mandamus to compel
the correct action. 439
c. Mandamus to compel an initiative or referendum. With certain exceptions, mandamus will not issue to
compel use of the initiative process m relation to a
rezoning. 440
d. Mandamus to follow local procedure. Local governments must obey the procedural requirements of their own
zoning ordinance, and mandamus may issue to correct official
conduct in violation thereof. 441

J.

Injunction by Private Party

In contrast to the remedy of mandamus, which is used to
compel public officials to perform nondiscretionary functions,
the remedy of injunction has been used by private parties to
prevent action by other private parties. In some instances, the
remedy of injunction has been used to prevent public officials
from performing unlawful acts.
436. See generally Hatch v. Utah County Planning Dep't, 685 P.2d 550 (Utah
1984); Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 659 P.2d 1065
(Utah 1983); Crist v. Bishop, 520 P.2d 196 (Utah 1974).
437. The only objection to mandamus in the context of zoning administration
is its use as a substitute for an appeal. E.g., Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633,
634 (Utah 1972). Absent that flaw-substituting mandamus for an appeal-nothing
in the reported cases precludes the use of mandamus. E.g., Hatch, 68fi P.2d at
550.
438. See generally Thurston v. Cache County, 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981);
Wright Dev. Inc. v. City of Wellsville, 608 P.2d 232 (Utah 1980); Seal v. Mapleton
City, 598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979).
439. See generally Wood v. North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858 (Utah 1964); Davis
County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
440. See supra text accompanying note 178 for a discussion related to the use
of initiatives and referenda.
441. See generally Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah 1974); Wood
v. North Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858 (Utah 1964).
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1. Injunction cases
In Benjamin v. Lietz,442 the Utah Supreme Court issued
an injunction to prevent a nuisance (the operation of a sawmill
at unreasonable times), even though the sawmill operation clid
not violate zoning regulations; in Judkins v. Fronk, 443 an injunction prevented the construction of a service station, notwithstancling the Ogden City Board of Commissioners had
granted a builcling permit; in Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows
Co., 444 an injunction preventing the construction of a mobile
trailer park was refused on the grounds that the plaintiffs had
failed to exercise their administrative remedies; and, in
Swenson v. Salt Lake Cit:> ,445 an injunction was granted preventing enforcement of an order of the board of adjustment
that a carport be removed.
Additionally, in Tolman v. Salt Lake County, 446 a temporary injunction was granted preventing the enforcement of a
rezoning because of defects in giving proper public notice; in
Padjen v. Shipley, 447 an injunction preventing the keeping of
dogs in a pen or run was refused because the same was not
prohibited by the zoning ordinance; in Call v. City of West Jordan,448 subdividers were refused injunctive relief protecting
them from the terms of a subclivision orclinance which required
them to donate land or money to the city as a condition of project approval; in Harris v. Springville City, 449 an injunction
was granted preventing a commercial operation in a residential
district; and, in Chambers v. Smithfield City, 450 an injunction
was granted prohibiting the exercise of a variance granted by
the city for which the applicant was not qualified.

2. Injunction principles
The holdings in the foregoing injunction actions may be
summarized as follows:

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.

211
234
392
398
437
553
606
712
714

P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d
P.2d

449 (Utah 1949).
849 (Utah 1951).
40 (Utah 1964).
879 (Utah 1965).
442 (Utah 1968).
938 (Utah 1976).
217 (Utah 1979).
188 (Utah 1984).
1133 (Utah 1986).
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a. Injunction by a private party against a private
party. A private party having standing451 may obtain an injunction preventing another private party from acting in violation of a zoning ordinance. 452
b. Injunction as a substitute for an appeal. Injunctive relief may not be used as a substitute for an
appeal; and, if injunctive relief is improperly substituted for an
appeal, the action will be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 453 On the other hand, nothing in these
holdings precludes the use of injunctive relief, in association
with an appeal, for the purpose of preventing violation of a
zoning ordinance if an appeal is resolved in favor of the appellant.
c. Injunction to prevent enforcement. An injunction
may be used to prevent incorrect enforcement of zoning
ordinances454 and to prevent the enforcement of zoning ordinances which are invalidly enacted. 455
d. Injunction to prevent a nuisance. An injunction
may be used to prevent a nuisance even though the use is otherwise generally permitted by the zoning ordinance. 456
K.

Declaratory Judgment

In three reported cases, a private party has pleaded the
Utah declaratory judgment statute. In all three of these cases
the plaintiff was unsuccessful on the merits. In Phi Kappa Iota
Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 457 a declaratory judgment action
unsuccessfully challenged the validity of a zoning regulation
which restricted fraternity and sorority houses to an area near
the University of Utah; in Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 458 a
declaratory judgment action unsuccessfully challenged a rezoning on the grounds that it was capricious and arbitrary; and, in
Buhler v. Stone, 459 a declaratory judgment action unsuccess-

451. For a discussion of standing, see infra text accompanying note 460.
452. Harris, 712 P.2d at 191.
453. Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 392 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah 1964).
454. Call v. City of W. Jordan, 606 P.2d 217 (Utah 1979); Padjen v. Shipley,
553 P.2d 938 (Utah 1976).
455. Call v. City of W. Jordan, 727 P.2d 180 (Utah 1986); Tolman v. Salt Lake
County, 437 P.2d 442 (Utah 1968).
456. Benjamin v. Lietz, 211 P.2d 449 (Utah 1949).
457. 212 P.2d 177 (Utah 1949).
458. 410 P.2d 764 (Utah 1966).
459. 533 P.2d 292 (Utah 1975).
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fully challenged, on grounds of vagueness, a regulation requiring that property be kept in a clean and sightly condition.

L.

Standing

By statute, a municipality, county, county attorney, or "any
owner of real estate"460 may bring an action to enforce the
acts or ordinances enacted pursuant to those acts. If the action
is for injunctive relief, the acts provide that a municipality or a
county "need only establish the violation to obtain the injunction."461 However, in Harris v. Springville City, 462 Utah's
high court held that, for a private party to obtain relief by enforcing the terms of a zoning ordinance, there must be a demonstration of standing, and standing is jurisdictional. 463
Standing requires that the plaintiffs demonstrate an adverse
interest, and, in the words of the Harris court, "that they
[have] suffered some injury peculiar to their own property or at
least more substantial than that suffered by the community at
large. "464

M.

Vested Rights

At what point can government no longer "change its mind"
in relation to uses which may be allowed? The phrase "vested
right" focuses on the moment when government can no longer
change its mind and the landowner concurrently has a fixed or
vested right to government approval for his or her project.
In 1974, the Utah Supreme Court decided Contracts Funding & Mortgage Exchange v. Maynes, 465 in which a property
owner applied to Salt Lake County for a building permit to
construct a mobile home park on what was then unzoned property. The county delayed the application until it could zone the
property and then denied the application. 466 The court held
that the landowner's rights were determined at the time he
made his application, and because a mobile home park was
permitted (or at least not prohibited) at the time of application,

460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1002(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-1002(1)(a) (1991).

!d. §§ 10-9-1002(1)(b), 17-27-1002(1)(b).
712 P.2d 188 (Utah 1984).

!d. at 190.
!d. at 191; see also Padjen v. Shipley, 553 P.2d 93R, 939 (Utah 1976).
527 P.2d 1073 (Utah 1974).

!d. at 1073-74.
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a permit should be issued if there were no defects in the application.467
The inflexibility of the Contracts Funding decision was
softened in 1980 when the Utah Supreme Court decided Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan. 468 In Western Land
Equities, the court held that the claim of a landowner to a
permit or approval based upon current zoning should be balanced against: ( 1) "compelling, countervailing public interest[s]"469; and, (2) the existence, if any, of pending proceedings to change zoning requirements. 470 The court held:
[A]n applicant is entitled to a building permit or subdivision
approval if his proposed development meets the zoning requirements in existence at the time of his application and if he
proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a compelling, countervailing public interest. Furthermore, if a city or county has
initiated proceedings to amend its zoning ordinances, a landowner who subsequently makes application for a permit is not
entitled to rely on the original zoning classification. 471

The Western Land Equities decision was reaffirmed in 1994
in Stucker v. Summit County. 472 In Stucker, the plaintiff purchased a lot in a subdivision which was originally platted in
1964. The Utah Court of Appeals held that the uses to which
the lot could be applied were those in effect when the application was made for a building permit in 1990, not those in
effect when the subdivision plat was approved in 1964. 473 The
court stated:

467. !d. at 1074 (where the holding was clear but the basis for it was not
clearly articulated. However, the court did state: "The presumption in this case is
in favor of the applicant's right, with incidental, but serious constitutional and other problems posed by the facts here as to due process, impairment of the obligation of contracts, scope of sover<~ign authority, etc.").
468. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980).
469. !d. at 896.
470. !d.
471. !d. (emphasis added); see also Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d
897, 900-01 (Utah 1988) (holding that because plaintiff's application was defective
and because a zone change was pending at the time of the plaintiff's application,
the plaintiff failed both of the Western Land Equities tests and was not entitled to
a building permit).
472. 870 P.2d 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
47:3. The Stucker decision bears a superficial resemblance to Wood v. North
Salt Lake, 390 P.2d 858 (Utah 1964), but in Wood, the city was indirectly attempting to amend subdivision plat boundaries by a zoning ordinance text amendment,
whereas in Stucker, only the uses within the subdivision plat were affected.
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Accordingly, pursuant to the Western Land decision, the
Stuckers' application for a building permit in 1990 fixed the
1985 Code as the governing ordinance, not the 1977 Code.
Thus, the Stuckers have no claim of a vested right under the
1977 Code because they did not apply for a building permit
during the period when the 1977 Code applied. 474

N.

Other Remedies

As discussed above, remedies available in a zoning enforcement action include injunctions, mandamus, or abatement for
the purpose of preventing or removing the unlawful building or
use. 475 Concerning these remedies, "[ w]hen a municipal corporation seeks vindication of public rights by injunction, in a
court of equity, it is on the same footing as any private person
or corporation."476 In addition, a structure in violation of a
zoning ordinance may be ordered removed, 477 and a municipality may enforce its zoning ordinance by withholding building
permits. 478 Moreover, the legislative body may choose to enforce its zoning ordinance by the use of civil penalties. 479
Criminal violations of the zoning ordinance are punishable as
class C misdemeanors. 480

VI.

BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

[A board of adjustment's] functions are limited to making
adjustments under the ordinances in order that they will not
be as the law of the Medes and the Persians. 481

A.

Creation

In cities and counties, a board of adjustment is required as
a condition to the exercise of zoning powers. 482 A city board

474.
475.
476.
477.
structed
478.
4 79.
480.
481.
482.

Stucker, 870 P.2d at 286.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1002(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-1002(1)(a) (1991).
Salt Lake County v. Kartchner, 552 P.2d 136, 138-39 (Utah 1976).
Hargraves v. Young, 280 P.2d 974, 975 (Utah 1955) (ordering carport conin violation of sideyard requirements to be removed).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1002(2) (1992).
ld. § 10-9-1003(1), (2)(b).
ld. § 10-9-1003(2)(a).
Provo City v. Claudin, 63 P.2d 570, 574 (Utah 1936).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-701(1) (1992), 17-27-701(1) (Supp. 1994).
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consists of five members, 483 whereas a county board has either three or five. 484 The literal statutory language for county
boards is "three to five members,"485 but voting requirements
are given only for three- and five-member boards,486 implying
that an odd number of members is intended.
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no apparent reason for
a county board of adjustment to have "three to five" members
while a city board of adjustment has five members. The acts
should be made uniform by amending the county act to provide that a county board of adjustment shall have five members.487

Members of city boards serve staggered488 terms of five
years, 489 whereas members of county boards serve whatever
term length is prescribed in the county zoning ordinance. 490
Earlier statutory provisions that required or limited service on
city and county boards of adjustment by a member of the planning commission have been repealed. 491
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no apparent reason to
require members of a city board of adjustment to serve a term
of five years while members of a county board of adjustment
serve the term length prescribed in the county zoning ordinance. The acts should be made uniform by amending the city
act to provide that members of a city board of adjustment

483. ld. § 10-9-701(2)(a).
484. ld. § 17-27-701(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1994).
485. ld. § 17-27-701(2)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
486. ld. § 17-27-702(5).
487. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-701(2)(a) should be amended as follows:
(2)(b) The board of adjustment shall consist of [thFee to] five members
and whatever alternate members that the chief executive officer considers
appropriate.
488. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-701(2)(c) (1992).
489. ld. § 10-9-701(2)(b).
490. ld. § 17-27-701(2)(b) (Supp. 1994).
491. Compare Planning, ch. 15, sec. 1, § 15-8-96, 1949 Utah Laws 20, 21-22
(repealed 1991) and Board of Adjustment Amendments, ch. 124, sec. 2, § 10-9-7,
1987 Utah Laws 684, 685 (repealed 1991) (outlining city requirements relating to
planning commission members serving on a board of adjustment) and Zoning and
Planning Commission, ch. 23, § 15, 1941 Utah Laws 29, 33 (repealed 1991) (outlining county requirements relating to planning commission members serving on a
board of adjustment) with Planning and Zoning Revisions, ch. 235, sees. 33, 86,
§§ 10-9-701, 17-27-701, 1991 Utah Laws 873, 883, 896 (outlining city and county
requirements relating to members of a board of adjustment).
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shall serve the term length prescribed in the city zoning ordinance.492

Alternate members may be appointed in cities and counties
in whatever number "the chief executive officer considers appropriate."493 In both cities and counties, the legislative body
is required to adopt rules regulating the service of alternate
members, 494 with the limitation that "[n]o more than two alternate members may sit at any meeting of the board of adjustment at one time."495 If this limitation (no more than two alternate members may sit at one time) is intended to ensure a
majority of regular board members at any meeting, it will succeed in cities but may not in counties, because counties may
elect to use a three-member board instead of the five-member
board that cities must use.
In cities and counties, appointment of board members,
including alternates, is made by the chief executive officer,
with the advice and consent of the legislative body. 496 The
chief executive officer may remove any member for cause,
based on written charges, 497 with a public hearing at the
member's demand. 498 If an appointment is made to fill a vacancy, the appointee serves for the balance of the unfinished
term. 499 In addition, an administrative officer may be appointed to "decide routine and uncontested matters before the
board of adjustment."500
In cities, the chief executive officer is the mayor, unless
there is a city manager, 501 in which event the city manager
appoints board members. In counties, the chief executive officer
is the county commissioner, unless the county has adopted an

492. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-701(2)(b) should be amended as follows:
(b) The chief executive officer shall appoint the members and alternate
members with the advice and consent of the legislative body for a term
[af five years] established by ordinance.
493.
494.
495.
496.
497.
498.
499.
500.
501.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-701(2)(a) (1992), 17-27-701(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1994).

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

§§
§§
§§
§§
Id. §§
ld. §§

10-9-701(3)(b), 17-27-701(3)(b).
10-9-701(3)(a), 17-27-701(:-l)(a).
10-9-701(2)(b), 17-27-701(2)(c).
10-9-701(4)(a), 17-27-701(4)(a).
10-9-701(4)(b), 17-27 -701(4){b).
10-9-701(5)(b), 17-27-701(5){b).
ld. §§ 10-9-705, 17-27-705.
ld. § 10-9-103(1)(b).
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alternative form of government, in which event appointments
are made by the official who exercises executive powers. 502

B.

Meetings and Records

In cities and counties, board members are empowered to
organize and elect a chair. 503 In addition, they may adopt
rules which are not inconsistent with their zoning ordinance.504 The board meets at the call of the chair or as the
board otherwise determines. 505 The chair, or acting chair,
may administer oaths and compel the attendance of witnesses.506 Board members may be compensated on a per diem basis for their service. 507

1.

Open meetings

In cities and counties, "[a}ll meetings" of a board of adjustment must comply with the requirements of the Open and
Public Meetings law. 508 That law prohibits closed meetings by
a public body, 509 with statutory exceptions not generally applicable to the business of a board of adjustment. 510 As a matter of practice, it is not uncommon for the business of a board
to be subdivided into three different parts: (1) a private "premeeting" in which staff review the public meeting agenda with
board members and educate them with respect to issues on
which they may be required to make a decision; (2) a general
public meeting in which evidence and public comment are received in relation to issues before the board; and, (3) a private
meeting of the board in which evidence and law are discussed
and decisions made. 5n Contrary to some of this practice,
Utah Supreme Court decisions require all but the last of these
meetings to be open to the public.

502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
1988).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
I d.
!d.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§ 17-27-103(1)(b) (Supp. 1994).
§§ 10-9-702(1)(a) (1992), 17-27-702(1)(a) (Supp. 1994).
§§ 10-9-702(1)(b), 17-27-702(1)(b).
§§ 10-9-702(2), 17-27-702(2).
§§ 10-9-702(3), 17-27 -702(3).
§§ 10-9-702(7), 17-27 -702(7).
§§ 10-9-702(4)(a), 17-27-702(4)(a) (emphasis added).
§ fi2-4-3 (1989).
§ 52-4-5(1).
See, e.g., Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App.
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In Common Cause of Utah v. Utah Public Service Commission,512 the Utah Supreme Court applied the open meeting
requirement to the Utah Public Service Commission and noted
that some of the business of the commission is judicial in nature. In some things, "the Commission hears and determines
issues which are disputed between competing and protesting
[parties]," and, in resolving those issues, "the Commission is
required by law to operate very much in the same manner as
courts."513 Specifically, in such ')udicial" matters the commission "is empowered to conduct hearings, administer oaths,
compel attendance of witnesses, obtain depositions and the
production of documents. Its decisions are required to be supported by written findings." 514 Those matters which are thus
judicial in nature, the court said, have an "information obtaining'' phase and a "decision making'' phase. 515 As to the "decision making'' phase, the court recognized an implied exemption
from the open meetings requirements. 516
In Andrews v. Utah Board of Pardons, 517 when confronted with a claim that a meeting of the Utah Board of Pardons
should have been open to the public, the court applied its holding in Common Cause in a straightforward manner:
[T]he Board proceedings to date consisted not of information
gathering, but of deliberations over the petition for a new
commutation hearing, deliberations that included a review of
the full public commutation hearing held in 1989. If this is
the case, these proceedings would be of a judicial nature and
exempt from the provisions of the [Open and Public Meetings]
statute. 518

The statutory exceptions in the Open and Public Meetings
law do not authorize holding a private "pre-meeting" before a
public board meeting. 519 By their nature such meetings are
informational and not judicial, and, thus, there is no exemption
in the Common Cause holding. To the contrary, in Davis Coun-

512.
513.
li14.
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.

598 P.2d 1312 (Utah 1979).
ld. at 1314.
ld.
ld. at 1315.
ld.
836 P.2d 790 (Utah 1992).
ld. at 792-93 (emphasis added).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-5(1) (1989).
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ty v. Clearfield City, 520 the Utah Court of Appeals condemned
"the secretive nature and lack of any record or minutes" of premeetings. 521
Meetings of a board of adjustment for the purpose of receiving evidence and public comment must obviously be open to
the public; nonetheless, the board may thereafter retire to
deliberate privately. As to private deliberations, a board of
adjustment, like the Public Service Commission in Common
Cause, must in judicial fashion decide issues between competing parties. 522 It follows that a board of adjustment is exempt
from the open meeting requirement when deliberating.

2. Records
The records of a board of adjustment must be kept in the
office of the board. 523 In addition, "[a]ll records in the office of
the board of adjustment are public records"524 ; under the provisions of the Government Records Access and Management
Act, any person may examine and copy public records. 525

C.

General Function

In Provo City v. Claudin, 526 the Utah Supreme Court declared that the purpose of a board of adjustment is to make
adjustments under a zoning ordinance, with the objective "to
make the [zoning] ordinance pliable enough so as not to militate against the public welfare."527 However, in Claudin, and
later in Walton v. Tracy Loan and Trust Co., 528 the court cautioned that a board of adjustment is an administrative body
and its actions are limited by the terms of the zoning ordinance
enacted by the legislative body. 529 Since Walton, the Utah

fi20. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (decided on other grounds).
521. ld. at 709.
fi22. E.g., UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703 (1992), 17-27-703 (Supp. 1994).
fi23. ld. §§ 10-9-702(4)(d), 17-27-702(4)(d).
524. ld. §§ 10-9-702(4)(e), 17-27-702(4)(e) (emphasis added).
525. ld. § 6:3-2-201(1) (1993) ("Every person has the right to inspect a public
record free of charge, and the right to take a copy of a public record during normal working hours . . . . ").
526. 63 P.2d 570 (Utah 1936).
527. ld. at 574.
528. 92 P.2d 724 (Utah 1939).
529. ld. at 728 ("The board of zoning appeals (board of adjustment) is entrusted with the duty of enforcing the provisions of the ordinance; it is an administrative body, without a vestige of legislative power."); see also Claudin, 63 P.2d
at 574.
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courts have been consistent in holding that the work of a board
of adjustment is administrative in nature and not legislative.
In Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 530 the Utah Supreme
Court reiterated this point when it stated, "we hold that the
authority to resolve zoning disputes is properly an executive
function rather than a legislative one."531 Similarly, the court
of appeals in Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District v.
Sandy City held: "we conclude that the hearing of conditional
use permit appeals is an executive function and not a legislative function." 532

D.

Legislative Body Versus Board of Adjustment

The statutory proposition that a board of adjustment may
make final decisions in matters of zoning administration has
been contested by local legislative bodies wishing to reserve
that power to themselves. Thus, there is a tendency for a local
legislative body to enact a zoning ordinance which purports to
grant powers of zoning administration to the legislative body
which, by statute, are the business of the board of adjustment.
Chronologically, the seminal decision was a county case,
Thurston v. Cache County, 533 in which the Utah Supreme
Court approved a zoning ordinance procedure wherein conditional use permit appeals went from the planning commission
to the county commission, and not to the board of adjustment.534 The county enabling act then in force provided that
the county commission "may provide that the board of adjustment may ... make special exceptions."535 The court held the
discretionary form of this language gave the county a choice
whether to vest special exception (conditional use 536) appeals
in the board of adjustment or elsewhere. 537 However, in all of
the city cases which followed, the result differed for a variety of
reasons.

530. 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988).
531. Id. at 899 (emphasis added).
532. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
533. 626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981).
534. Id. at 444-47.
535. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-15 (1953) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added).
536. For a discussion of special exceptions and conditional uses, see supra
parts III.G-H.
537. Thurston., 626 P.2d at 446.
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The first city case on this issue was Chambers v.
Smithfield City, 538 in which the zoning ordinance gave the
city council final authority to grant variances, like the county
commission did with special exceptions (conditional uses) in
Thurston. But the city enabling act then in force provided that
the board of adjustment shall have the power to authorize variances.539 The Utah Supreme Court held that the mandatory
form of this language required that only the board of adjustment, and not the city council, had authority to grant
variances. 540
The next city case was Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp. 541
Factually, Scherbel was like Thurston (a county decision) to the
extent that, in both cases, the local zoning ordinance purported
to give jurisdiction over special exceptions (conditional use
permits) to the legislative body and not to the board of adjustment. But the two cases were different for two reasons: first,
Salt Lake City operated under an optional council-mayor form
of government, and, second, the county enabling act then in
force allowed discretion with respect to special exception (conditional use permit) jurisdiction, 542 but the city enabling act
then in force did not. 543 The Scherbel court focused on both
differences and invalidated the procedure which allowed the
Salt Lake City municipal council to hear and decide special
exceptions.
Specifically, the Scherbel court noted its holding in
Martindale v. Anderson, that resolving zoning disputes is an
executive function, 544 and ruled that a municipal council handling such matters violated the concept of a separation of powers.545 In addition, the Court held that its reasoning in
Chambers applied to special exceptions as well as to variances.
That is, the city enabling act provided that "[t]he board of adjustment shall have [the power to hear and decide special exceptions]," and the mandatory form of this language vested

538. 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986).
539. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-12 (1953) (repealed 1991).
540. Chambers, 714 P.2d at 1137.
541. 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988).
542. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-16(2) (1953) (repealed 1991).
543. !d. § 10-9-12(2) (1953) (repealed 1991).
544. Scherbel, 758 P.2d at 899 (noting Martindale v. Anderson, 5R1 P.2d 1022,
1027 (Utah 1978)).
545. !d. "As in Martindale, we hold that the authority to resolve zoning disputes is properly an executive function rather than a legislative one." !d.
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only the board of adjustment, and not the municipal council,
with authority to hear and decide special exceptions. 546
The result was the same in Davis County v. Clearfield
City, 547 an opinion by the court of appeals which was handed
down only ten days after the opinion of the Utah Supreme
Court in Scherbel. The Clearfield City zoning ordinance required that conditional use decisions by the planning commission be appealed to the city council and not to the board of
adjustment. Although Clearfield City was not operating under
the Optional Forms of Government Act, the court disapproved
the procedure, applying the Chambers and Scherbel reasoning,
which stated that the mandatory language of the city enabling
act permitted only a board of adjustment to hear and decide
zoning appeals related to conditional uses. 548
The most recent of these cases, Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Sandy City, 549 focuses on statutory
language that originated as a 1989 amendment to the Utah
Municipal Code. The Utah Municipal Code provided that
"[a]ppeals from decisions of the planning and zoning commission regarding conditional use permits shall be heard by the
board of adjustment unless the legislative body of the municipality by ordinance has designated another body as the appellate body for those matters."550 Drawing on this language
(that the legislative body may designate a body other than the
board of adjustment to hear conditional use permit appeals),
the Sandy City zoning ordinance vested in the municipal council (operating in a council-mayor form of government) the power
to hear appeals from conditional use permit decisions. But
again, the Utah Court of Appeals disagreed, focusing on the
holding established in Martindale that a legislative body operating under The Optional Forms of Government Act cannot
perform executive functions of zoning administration. That
principle, declared the court, requires an interpretation of sec-

546. !d. "However, in Chambers, we explained that 'the statutory provisions
regarding county boards of adjustment are entirely different from those concerning
city boards of adjustment.'" !d. n.4; see Chambers, 714 P.2d at 1137.
fi47. 7fi6 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
548. Scherbel, 758 P.2d at 899.
549. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
550. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-8(3) (1989) (emphasis added). This provision was
recodified in substantially the same form in the Municipal Land Use Development
and Management Act as UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-407(2) and 10-9-704(2). See infra
part VI.H.1 for further discussion of these provisions.
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tion 10-9-8(3) that the chosen appellate body be one outside the
legislative branch of government. 551

E. Board of Adjustment Jurisdiction
Against a backdrop of the jurisdictional struggle between
boards of adjustment and legislative bodies, the new enabling
acts provide that a legislative body may choose in several matters whether decisions will be made by a board of adjustment
or by another body, which is usually the legislative body itself.
The matters of zoning administration over which a board of
adjustment must have, or may be given, jurisdiction in a zoning ordinance include: (a) appeals from zoning decisions; (b)
special exceptions; (c) conditional use permits; (d) variances;
and, (e) nonconforming uses.
F.

Zoning Appeals

The first class of issues over which city and county boards
of adjustment have jurisdiction may be referred to as zoning
appeals. A board of adjustment in cities and counties has exclusive jurisdiction in these matters because the enabling acts
provide that a board of adjustment "shall hear and decide"
controversies which are "appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning ordinance."552 Zoning decisions which may be
appealed include orders, requirements, decisions, or determinations made by zoning officials in administering or interpreting
the zoning ordinance. 553
Curiously, however, a county board of adjustment may not
"interpret the zoning maps and pass upon disputed questions of
lot lines, district boundary lines, or similar questions" (not to
be confused with the power to interpret the text of a zoning
ordinance), unless so authorized by the legislative body. 554
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no apparent reason
why a county board of adjustment should require special
authorization to "interpret the zoning maps and pass upon
disputed questions of lot lines, district boundary lines, or
similar questions,"555 while city boards of adjustment have
551. Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist., 879 P.2d at 13R3 n.5.
552. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703(1) (1992), 17-27-703(1) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
553. Id. §§ 10-9-704ClXaXi), 17-27-704(1Xa)(i).
554. ld. § 17-27-703(3) (emphasis added).
55fi. ld. § 17-27-703(3).
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no such limitation. The county act should be amended to
repeal this limitation. 556
Zoning decisions may be appealed by persons affected
thereby557 and by officers and subdivisions of the city or county.558 The time within which to appeal a zoning decision to a
board of adjustment is "a reasonable time," which is fixed in
the zoning ordinance. 559
Proposed Legislative Change. The zoning ordinance establishes the time within which to appeal to a board of adjustment;
but some zoning ordinances are in disrepair and may fail to
so provide. To avoid jurisdictional problems, the enabling acts
should provide a time period for appeal to be used if the zoning ordinance does not provide such a time period. 560

The former city enabling act specified in detail: with whom
a notice of appeal should be filed and the content of that
notice; 561 the staying of a zoning decision by a board of adjustment pending a decision on the merits;562 the transmittal
of records;563 notice to parties in interest and the general

556. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-703(3) should be repealed.
557. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-704(1)(a)(i) (1992), 17-27-704(l)(a)(i) (Supp.
1994).
558. ld. §§ 10-9-704(1)(b), 17-27-704(1)(b).
559. ld. §§ 10-9-704(1)(a)(ii), 17-27-704(1)(a)(ii).
560. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-704(1)(a)(ii) and 17-27-704(1)(a)(ii)
should both be amended as follows:
(ii) The legislative body shall enact an ordinance establishing a reasonable time for appeal to the board of decisions administering or interpreting a zoning ordinance. If the legislative body does not so provide, the
time for appeal shall be ten (10) days from the date the decision is rendered.
561. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-9 (1953) (repealed 1991).
562. ld. § 10-9-10 (1953) (repealed 1991). In the original city enabling act, an
administrative appeal automatically stayed all proceedings unless the administrative officer (because of "imminent peril to life or property") requested otherwise, in
which event the appellant could request a restraining order from the board or a
district court. This procedure was not changed until 1991. Compare Cities to Regulate Size of Buildings, Use of Land, Etc., ch. 119, § 7, 1925 Utah Laws 240, 24244 (repealed 1991) with Planning and Zoning Revisions, ch. 235, sec. 36, § 10-9704, 1991 Utah Laws R73, 884. The county enabling acts contained no provisions
related to a stay of proceedings, but, in general, permitted a county commission to
establish procedures related to appeals. Compare Zoning and Planning Commission,
ch. 23, § 16, 1941 Utah Laws 29, 33-34 (repealed 1991) with Planning and Zoning
Revisions, ch. 235, sec. 89, § 17-27-704, 1991 Utah Laws 873, 897.
563. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-9 (1953) (repealed 1991).
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public; 564 the obligation of the board to make a timely decision;565 and, appearances by agents or attorneys. 566 In contrast, the former county enabling act gave no guidance with
respect to these details and provided instead that they would
be resolved in "general rules" provided by the county commission or in "supplemental rules of procedure" adopted by the
board of adjustment itself. 567
The present enabling acts adopt the county approach regarding these issues, and in cities and counties such are now
left to local discretion in the zoning ordinance or the rules of
the board. 568 On the other hand, new mandatory procedural
provisions have been adopted in both enabling acts which: provide that the appellant has the burden of proving the existence
of error569 ; limit subject matter jurisdiction to decisions applying a zoning ordinance 570 ; prohibit consideration by a board of
adjustment of zoning ordinance amendments57 \ and, prohibit
a board of adjustment from waiving or modifying zoning ordinance requirements. 572
For a city board, the concurring vote of three out of five
members is required to reverse an administrative decision. 57:3
For a county board, however, a vote of four out of five members
for a five-member board, and a unanimous vote of three members for a three-member board, is required to reverse an administrative decision. 574
Proposed Legislative Change. There is no apparent reason
why the voting requirements should differ between cities
(three out of five votes to reverse) and counties (four out of
five votes to reverse). Majority-rule (three out of five votes) is
traditional, and the county act should be so amended to pro-

564.
565.
566.
567.
568.
569.
570.
571.
572.
573.
574.

ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
I d.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.
ld.

§ 10-9-11 (1953) (repealed 1991).

§ 17-27-16 (1953) (repealed 1991).
§§ 10-9-702(1)(b) (1992), 17-27-702(1)(b) (Supp. 1994).
§§ 10-9-704(3), 17-27 -704(2) (1992).
§§ 10-9-704(4)(a), 17-27-704(3)(a).
§§ 10-9-704(4)(b), 17-27-704(3)(b).
§§ 10-9-704(5), 17-27-704(4).
§ 10-9-702(5).
§ 17-27-702(5) (Supp. 1994).
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vide. 575 (It is recommended elsewhere that counties should
have only five-member boards of adjustment. 576)

G.

Special Exceptions

In both cities and counties, the jurisdiction of a board of
adjustment over "special exceptions"577 is described in the following language: {1) Sections 10-9-703(1)(b) and 17-27703(1)(b): "[t]he board of adjustment shall hear and decide ...
special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance"578 ; (2)
Sections 10-9-706(1)(b) and 17-27-706(1)(b): "[i]n enacting the
zoning ordinance, the legislative body may ... grant jurisdiction to the board of adjustment to hear and decide some or all
special exceptions"579 ; and, (3) Sections 10-9-706(2) and 17-27706(2): "[t]he board of adjustment may hear and decide special
exceptions only if authorized to do so by the zoning ordinance ... .''580
On their face, these three provisions are inconsistent. 581

575. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-702(5) should be amended as follows:
(t&l-ln onler to re•<erse any oraer, requirement, aeeisien, Of aetenmna
tHm of any administrative offieial er ageney er te aeeiae in favor of the
appellant, there mast be a eonearring 'iote ef:
(a) fear members for a five member boara of aajastment; er
· (b) three members for a three member boara ef adjustment.]
(5) The concurring vote of three members of the board of adjustment is
necessary to reverse any order, requirement, decision, or determination of
any administrative official or agency or to decide in favor of the appellant.
The proposed language is taken from UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-702(5) (1992).
576. See discussion supra part VI.A.
577. See supra text accompanying note 225 for a discussion on the meaning of
the term "special exception."
fi78. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ l0-9-708(1)(h) (1992), 17-27-708(1)(b) (Supp. 1994)
(emphasis added).
579. !d. §§ 10-9-706(l)(b), 17-27-706(1)(1) (emphasis added).
580. !d. §§ 10-9-706(2), 17-27-706(2) (emphasis added).
581. It may be possible to reconcile these provisions by reference to the city
enabling provisions which preceded them. From 1925 to 1991, the city enabling act
provided that a "board of adjustment shall have the following power: . . . (2) To
hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance upon which such
board is required to pass under such ordinance." !d. § 10-9-12(2) (1958) (repealed
1991) (emphasis added). In short, a board of adjustment shall have jurisdiction to
hear and decide special exceptions to the extent that such is permitted by the
terms of the zoning ordinance. By straining, it is possible to find the same meaning in the present sections. Thus, § 708(1)(b) may be read to provide that a board
of adjustment shall hear and decide special exceptions as the legislative body may
permit, as provided in §§ 706(1)(b) and 706(2). But this interpretation stretches the
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Section 703(1) provides that a board of adjustment shall have
jurisdiction over special exceptions, but sections 706(1) and
706(2) provide that a board of adjustment may have that jurisdiction if the legislative body so provides.
Proposed Legislative Change. There is a conflict in the statutory provisions conferring board of adjustment jurisdiction
over "special exceptions." Both acts should be amended to give
the legislative body discretion to determine the extent of the
board of adjustment's jurisdiction over "special exceptions."582

H.
1.

Conditional Use Permits

Conditional use permits in cities

The city enabling act handles board of adjustment jurisdiction over conditional use permits differently than does the
county enabling act. The jurisdiction of a city board of adjustment in relation to conditional use permits is stated in three
different sections: (1) Section 10-9-407(2): "[t]he board of adjustments has jurisdiction to decide appeals of the approval or
denial of conditional use permits unless the legislative body
has enacted an ordinance designating another body as the
appellate body for those appeals."583 ; (2) Section 10-9-704(2):
"[t]he board of adjustment shall hear and decide appeals from
planning commission decisions regarding conditional use permits unless the zoning ordinance designates another body to
hear conditional use permit appeals."584 ; and, (3) Section 109-706(3): "[t]he legislative body may provide that conditional
use permits be treated as special exceptions in the zoning ordinance."585

2.

The planning commission assumption

With the enactment of the sections quoted above, the state
legislature obviously assumed that in all cities a conditional
use permit will initially be approved or denied by the planning
plain meaning of § 703(1)(b) almost beyond the breaking point.
582. For a specific proposal to revise the enabling acts in relation to board of
adjustment jurisdiction over "special exceptions," see discussion infra note 598 and
accompanying text.
583. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-407(2) (1992) (emphasis added).
584. ld. § 10-9-704(2) (emphasis added).
585. ld. § 10-9-706(3) (emphasis added).
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commission. Examples of this procedure (conditional use permits being first approved or denied by the planning commission) are described in Davis County v. Clearfield Citl 86 and
Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp. 587 Assuming original action
by the planning commission, the real question addressed by the
quoted sections is what body will thereafter hear conditional
use permit appeals from the planning commission. The clear
answer of the quoted sections is that the local legislative body
can choose the body it wants; although, in practical terms, the
two obvious choices are the board of adjustment or the legislative body itself.

3.

The Orem City example

But the assumption that conditional use permits will always be issued first by the planning commission is incorrect.
Consider, for example, a city such as Orem, Utah: the terms of
the zoning ordinance allow the planning commission only to
recommend the approval or denial of a conditional use permit,
after which the official decision to approve or deny is made by
the city council. 588 In relation to Orem's conditional use structure, the three sections quoted above wreak procedural havoc.
When section 407(2) is applied to an administrative structure such as that in Orem, the result is that section 407(2)
requires that the board of adjustment (or some other body
designated by the city council) review the decisions of the city
council. This is objectionable because it places the legislative
body (the author of the zoning ordinance and the creator of the
board of adjustment) in a subordinate position in relation to
the administration of conditional use permits. Indeed, in
Thurston v. Cache County, 589 when the Utah Supreme Court
heard the argument that a board of adjustment must review
permits issued by the county commission, the court mildly
ridiculed the argument by saying that "[p]laintiffs' interpretation ... imposes a curious administrative paradox."590
Neither the language of section 704(2) nor the language of
section 706(3) will rescue a city like Orem from the "curious
administrative paradox" created by the convergence of the city

586.
587.
588.
589.
590.

756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988).
0REM, UTAH, 0REM CITY CODE § 22-4-3 (1990).
626 P.2d 440 (Utah 1981).
!d. at 446.
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council's desire to originally issue conditional use permits and
the requirements of section 407(2). Section 704(2) offers no help
because by its terms it applies to "appeals from planning commission decisions,"591 not city council decisions. Moreover,
section 706(3) offers no help because it simply allows conditional use permits to be treated as special exceptions, in which
event the permit could be issued by the board of adjustment,
without city council involvement.

4.

Conditional use permits in counties

With respect to the administrative process for conditional
use permits in counties, there is no counterpart to either the
troublesome section 10-9-407(2) or to section 10-9-704(2). 592
The lack of statutory guidance for counties in relation to granting or denying conditional use permits means that a county
legislative body is constrained only by the normal bounds of
legislative discretion in the structure of its conditional use
permit process. 593 Counties do, however, have a counterpart
to section 10-9-706(3),594 which provides that conditional use
permits may be treated as special exceptions in the zoning ordinance; in other words, they may be directly issued by the board
of adjustment.
Proposed Legislative Change. There are three statutory problems which come together at this point: (1) in cities, the statutory conflict concerning board of adjustment jurisdiction over
"special exceptions"595 ; (2) in cities, the statutory assumption that all conditional use permits will first be granted by a
planning commission 596 ; and, (3) in counties, the lack of
statutory guidance with respect to conditional use permit appeals.597 These three problems should be resolved: (1) in cities and counties, by giving the legislative body discretion to
decide whether special exception (conditional use permit) appeals will be handled by the board of adjustment or another

591. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-704(2) (1992) (emphasis added).
592. Compare id. §§ 10-9-407(2), -704(2) (1992) with id. §§ 17-27-406 (1991), 704 (Supp. 1994).
593. See generally State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980)
(Counties have "independent authority" to pass ordinances providing for public
safety, health, morals, and welfare.).
594. UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-706(;{) (Supp. 1994).
595. See discussion supra part VLG.
596. See discussion supra part VLH.2.
597. See supra the discussion in this immediate section.
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body; and, (2) in cities and counties, by allowing the legislative body the discretion to create alternative special exception
(conditional use permit) approval procedures. 598

I.

Variances

The enabling acts provide that a "board of adjustment shall
hear and decide . . . variances from the terms of the zoning
ordinance."599 The acts also provide that a person desiring a
variance "may apply to the board of adjustment."600 There are
no provisions to the contrary, with the result that a board of
adjustment has exclusive jurisdiction to grant variances. This
is consistent with the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in
Chambers v. Smithfield City, 601 holding that under the former
city enabling statute, a city board of adjustment has exclusive
jurisdiction to grant variances, which power cannot be vested
in a city council. 602
There are specific conditions prerequisite to granting a
variance. In summary form, those conditions include the following, all of which must be met:

598. Specifically, the following legislative changes should be made:
1. For a proposed legislative change providing that "a conditional use
is a type of special exception," see supra note 230 and accompanying text.
2. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-407(2) should be repealed.
3. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703 and 17-27-703 should be amended as
follows:
(1) Unless the legislative body (in any form of local government*) otherwise provides, t[~]he board of adjustment shall hear and decide:
(a) appeals from zoning decisions applying the zoning ordin1nce; and
(b) special exceptions to the terms of the zoning ordinance (including
conditional use permits).[~
(e) variaHees frsm the terms ef the ~sHiHg srdiHaHee.]
(2) Unless the legislative body (in any form of local government*) otherwise provides, t[~]he board of adjustment may make determinations regarding the existence, expansion, or modification of nonconforming uses [if
that llUthsrity is delegated ts them hy the legislati'le belly].
(3) The board of adjustment shall hear and decide variances from the
terms of the zoning ordinance.
(* The phrase "in any form of local government" should be deleted if it is
determined that legislative bodies in optional forms of government should
not participate in zoning administration.)
4. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-704(2) should be repealed.
5. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-706 and 17-27-706 should be repealed.
599.
600.
601.
602.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703(1)(c) (1992), 17-27-703(1)(c) (Supp. 1994).
!d. §§ 10-9-707(1), 17-27-707(1).
714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986).
!d. at 1136.
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Unreasonable hardship

A variance may be granted if literal enforcement of the
zoning ordinance would cause the applicant an unreasonable
hardship. 603 The hardship must be located on or associated
with the property, 604 come from conditions peculiar to the
property and not conditions general to the neighborhood, 605
and cannot be self-imposed or economic. 606

2.

Special circumstances

A variance may be granted if special circumstances attach
to the property which do not apply to other properties in the
same district. 607 The special circumstances must relate to the
hardship complained of608 and deprive the property of privileges granted to other properties in the same district. 609

3. Property rights
The granting of a variance must be "essential to the enjoyment of a substantial property right possessed by other property in the same district." 610

4.

General plan and public interest

Granting a variance may not substantially affect the general plan and may not be contrary to the public interest. 611

603. UTAH CoDE ANN. §§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(i) (1992), 17-27-707(2)(a)(i) (Supp.
1994).
604. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(b)(i)(A), 17-27 -707(2)(b)(i)(A).
605. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(b)(i)(B), 17-27 -707(2)(b)(i)(B).
606. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(b)(ii), 17-27-707(2)(b)(ii). "Economic hardship" apparently
refers to revenues which may be lost if a variance is not granted. See, e.g., Otto v.
Steinhilber, 24 N.E.2d 851, 852 (N.Y. 1939) (holding a variance allowing a property
owner to locate part of a roller skating rink on property zoned residential was improper because it did not meet the three elements constituting unnecessary hardship).
607. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(ii) (1992), 17-27-707(2)(a)(ii) (Supp.
1994).
608. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(c)(i), 17-27 -707(2)(c)(i).
609. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(c)(ii), 17 -27-707(2)(c)(ii).
610. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(iii), 17-27 -707(2)(a)(iii).
611. ld. §§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(iv), 17-27-707(2)(a)(iv).
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Spirit of ordinance and substantial justice

In granting a variance, the spirit of the zoning ordinance
must be observed and substantial justice done. 612

6.

Example of a variance

These statutory conditions are not otherwise explained.
Their apparent meaning may be illustrated by a simple example in which a small stream traverses a parcel of property. The
property owner is generally entitled to a building permit to
construct a residence, but placement of the residence caused by
the location of the stream causes a violation of sideyard requirements. A variance from enforcement of the sideyard requirements will, if granted, allow the applicant to construct a
residence.
The following is a discussion of the above requirements as
they relate to the example: (1) Unreasonable hardship: literal
enforcement of the sideyard requirements will unreasonably
prevent issuance of a building permit because sideyard requirements cannot be met. The hardship is located on the property
and comes from a problem peculiar to the property and not the
general neighborhood. The hardship is not self-imposed, and is
not economic; (2) Special circumstances: a stream causing a
sideyard violation is a problem only on this parcel of property,
and it is this circumstance which prevents issuance of a building permit. Other lots in the same district qualify for a building
permit; (3) Property rights: if a variance is not granted, the
applicant will not receive a building permit, which is a privilege enjoyed by other property in the district; (4) General plan
and public interest: the granting of a variance will not adversely affect the general plan or the public interest because the
general plan and the existing zone favor the construction of
residences in the district; and, (5) Spirit of ordinance and substantial justice: the spirit of the zoning ordinance is observed
because construction of a residence is permitted according to
the general intent of the zoning ordinance. Substantial justice
is accomplished because the applicant is treated consistently
with the treatment of others in the same district.

612. !d. §§ 10-9-707(2)(a)(v), 17-27 -707(2)(a)(v).
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Supporting evidence and other provisions

The acts provide that "[t]he applicant shall bear the burden of proving that all of the conditions justifying a variance
have been met."613 It has been held that a decision granting a
variance will not be sustained on appeal if there is not substantial evidence in the record to support it. 614 In Chambers v.
Smithfield City, 615 the Utah Supreme Court overturned the
grant of a variance to build a house on a .67-acre lot in a oneacre zone. According to the court, "[t]here is simply no evidence
in the record to support any one of the Board's findings. In fact,
what evidence exists tends only to support a denial of the variance."616
In Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 617
the Utah Supreme Court used the following language in overturning the grant of a variance:
It is not enough to show that the property for which the
variance is requested is different in some way from the property surrounding it. Each piece of property is unique. What
must be shown by the applicant for the variance is that the
property itself contains some special circumstance that relates
to the hardship complained of and that granting a variance to
take this into account would not substantially affect the zoning plan. Respondent has failed to meet this burden.
The evidence adduced does not support respondent's
claim of special circumstance. The property is neither unusual
topographically or by shape, nor is there anything extraordinary about the piece of property itself. Simply having an old
building on land upon which a new building has been constructed does not constitute special circumstances. 618

The acts also provide that variances "run with the
land,"619 and that conditions may be attached to the grant of
a variance. 620 Moreover, the acts provide that a "use variance" cannot be granted. 621
613. ld. §§ 10-9-707(3), 17-27-707(3).
614. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1038
(Utah 1984).
615. 714 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1986).
616. ld. at 1135.
617. 685 P.2d at 1032.
618. ld. at 1036.
619. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-707(4) (1992), 17-27-707(4) (Supp. 1994).
620. !d. §§ 10-9-707(6), 17-27 -707(6).
621. !d. §§ 10-9-707(5), 17-27 -707(5).
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A 'use' variance, as the term implies, is one which permits a use of land other than those prescribed by the zoning
regulations. Thus, a variance which permits a commercial use
in a residential district, or which permits a multiple dwelling
in a district limited to single-family homes, is a use variance.622

The variance described in the example above--a stream
crossing a residential building lot623-is not a "use" variance;
the applicant was asking for a permit to build a residence in a
district zoned residential. The variance related only to sideyard
requirements.

J.

Nonconforming Uses

The acts provide that "[t]he board of adjustment may make
determinations regarding the existence, expansion, or modification of nonconforming uses if that authority is delegated to
them by the legislative body."624 The acts do not explicitly
state what body will handle nonconforming use issues if a
board of adjustment does not. But the phrase-"delegated to
them by the legislative body"-suggests that such issues be
resolved by the legislative body, if not by a board of adjustment. However, in a city operating under the Optional Forms
of Government Act, such an interpretation is prevented by the
holding in Salt Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary District v.
Sandy City. 625 This holding prohibits, on separation of powers
grounds, a municipal council from performing administrative
functions. 626
Proposed Legislative Change. Many local zoning ordinances
are in disrepair, and if a local zoning ordinance does not authorize the board of adjustment to handle nonconforming use
issues, a jurisdictional ambiguity results. To minimize ambiguity, the presumption should be changed, giving the board of
adjustment jurisdiction over nonconforming uses, unless the
legislative body provides otherwise. 627

622. 83 AM. JUR. 2D Zoning and Planning § 836 (1992).
623. See discussion supra part VI.I.6.
624. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703(2) (1992), 17-27-70:-l(2) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
625. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
626. ld. at 1382-83.
627. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-703(2) and 17-27-703(2) should be
amended as follows:
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Three Utah cases deal with nonconforming uses, each holding that the burden of proving the right to a nonconforming use
is on the person claiming it. 628 The first case, Morrison v.
Horne, 629 was a demand for a building permit to construct a
service station in a residential zone. Although the property had
previously been used commercially when it was in a commercial zone, evidence showed that the commercial use had been
discontinued for five years. The zoning ordinance allowed a
discontinuance for no more than one year. The court held
against the landowner on the basis that he had failed to meet
his burden of proof that the commercial use had been lawfully
established and continuously maintained. 630
The same rule was applied in State v. Holt's Estate, 631 in
which landowners claimed that their property should be valued
as commercial for purposes of eminent domain. The property,
however, was zoned residential. The court held that the landowners had the burden of proving the continuation of a nonconforming use. Where, as here, the property had not been
used commercially for more than twelve years, the court cited
its holding in Morrison and held that the landowners had failed
to meet their burden of proving a continuation of the nonconforming use. 632
In Fillmore City v. Reeve, 633 however, the evidence confirmed that the landowners had met their burden of proof by
continuously keeping livestock (pigs, cattle, and horses) in what
had become a residential district that did not allow that use,
and that this activity did not constitute a nuisance. Under
these facts, the court held against the city because the city had
failed to meet its burden of proof. The court stated, "when the
non-conforming use is established, the burden of proof is reversed. It is then on the city to prove that the defendant violat-

(2) Unless otherwise determined by the legislative body, [~]!:_he board of
adjustment may make determinations regarding the existence, expansion,
or modification of nonconforming uses [if that aatheFity is delegated te
them hy the legislati•te he Ely].
628. A fourth case, Gibbons & Reed Co. v. North Salt Lake City, 4~1 P.2d
559, 564 (Utah 1967), discussed issues related to nonconforming uses but was ultimately decided on other grounds.
629. 868 P.2d 1.118 (Utah 1961).
6~0. ld. at 1114.
631. 3111 P.2d 724 (Utah 1963).
682. ld. at 725.
68~. 571 P.2d 1316 (Utah 1977).
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ed the zoning ordinance by exceeding his established non-conforming use." 634

VII.

APPEALS TO THE COURT

In the case at hand, the district judge undertook to
weigh anew the underlying factual considerations. While
there may have been some evidence in the record to support
the trial judge's findings, it was not his prerogative to weigh
the evidence anew. His role was limited to determining
whether there was evidence in the record to support the
Board of Adjustment's action. 635

A.

"Any Decision"

In cities and counties, "[a]ny person adversely affected by

any decision made in the exercise of the provisions of this chapter [the city and county enabling acts] may file a petition for
review of the decision with the district court within 30 days
after the local decision is rendered."636 This language is broad
enough to cover appeals from all decisions of a board of adjustment,637 as well as appeals from decisions of other bodies
such as a legislative body granting or denying a conditional use
permit. 638 Enabling provisions relating to subdivisions are included in the chapters comprising the city and county enabling
acts, 639 and thus the right of appeal also applies to subdivision Issues.
Proposed Legislative Change. In each enabling act there are
two sections dealing with the subject matter of appeals, resulting in possibilities for confusion. (For example, UTAH
CODE ANN. section 10-9-708(3) provides for appeal within 30
days after the "decision is final." In possible contrast is UTAH
CODE ANN. section 10-9-1001(2) which provides for appeal
within 30 days after the "decision is rendered.") Depending on

634. !d. at 1318.
635. 685 P.2d 1032, 1085 (Utah 1984).
636. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(2) (1992), 17-27-1001(2) (1991) (emphasis
added).
687. Parallel (and redundant) provisions are found in UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 109-708 (1992), 17-27-708 (1991).
638. Decisions regarding conditional use permits are made in the exercise of
the provisions of the Utah Code in Chapter 9, Title 10, as well as in Chapter 27,
Title 17. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-407 (1992), 17-27-406 (Supp. 1994).
639. !d. §§ 10-9-801 (1992), 17-27-801 (1991).
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the context, duplicative language like this can cause needless
confusion. The duplicative sections should be combined and
possible inconsistencies reconciled. 640

640. Specifically, UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-708 should be combined with and
numbered as UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-1001; and, UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-708
should be combined with and numbered as UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-27-1001, as
follows:
[19 9 198/11 ~1198, Qisk>iet eeYiA Pe¥ie""'' ef "he8PEI ef aEijastme&t
EleeisieRa
(1) Any person adversely affeeted lly any deeisien of a heard of adjust
meat may petitien the distriet eeurt fer a review of the deeisien.
(2) In the petitien, the plaintiff may only allege that the heard of
adjustment's deeisien 'NBS ar"hitraey, eapFieieus, OF illegal.
OJ The petition is haFFed unless it is filed within >!(). days after the
hoard of adjustment's deeisien is final.
(4)(a) The heard of adjustment shall transmit to the revie•o'ling eeurt the
reeerd ef its preeeedings inelu ding its minutes, findings, erdeFs and, if
available, a true and eeFFeet transeFipt of its pFeeeedings.
(h) If the pFeeeeding was tape Feeerded, a transeript of that tape re
eerding is a true and eeFFeet transeript faT pul'}3eSeA of this suhseetion.
(a)(a)(i) If theTe is a TeeoTd, the distTiet eourt's Teview .ffi-ffi:nited to the
Teeerd pro•rided hy the hoaFd of adjustment.
(ii) The eourt may net aeeept or eonsideT any evidenee outside the
hoard ef adjustment's reeeTd unless that evidenee was effuTed to the hoaTd
of adjustment and the eouTt determines that it was improperly exeused hy
the heard ef adjustment.
(h) If there is ne reeerd, the eourt may eall witnesses and talw evi
~

(G) The eeurt shall affum the deeiffien ef the beard of adjustment if the
deeision is supported hy substantial evidenee ie tfie reeord.(7)(a) The filing of a petition does net stay the deeisiml ef the board of
adjustment.
(h)(i) :BefeTe filing the petition, the aggrieYed paTty may petition the
heaTd of adjustment to stay its deeision.
(ii) Upon reeeipt ef a IJetitien to stay, tfie boaTEl ef adjuAtment may
eTdeT its deeisien stayed pending distriet eourt review if tfie boaTEl of
adjustment finds it to be in the best inteTest ef the munieiJ!ality.
(iii) After the IJetitien is filed tfie fletitieeer may seel< ae injunetien
staying the beard ef adjustment's deeisiee.]
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-708 and 17-27-708 should be amended as follows:
10-9-1001117-27-708. Appeals.*
[(21] (1) Any person adversely affected by any decision made in the exercise ~the provisions of this chapter may file a petition for review of the
decision with the district court within 30 days after the local decision is
rendered.
[(.lf] (2) No person may challenge in district court a municipality's land
use decisions made under this chapter or under the regulation made
under authority of this chapter until that person has exhausted his administrative remedies.
(a) In the petiti()n, the plaintiff may only allege that the board of
adjustment's decision was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.
[(.&}] (4) The courts shall:
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The scope of the "any decision" language makes it an improvement over the language of the former city enabling act,
which provided for appeals to the courts from "any decision of
the board of adjustment."641 The latter language was troublesome because it could be interpreted, as it was in Davis County
v. Clearfield City, 642 to provide that appeals to the courts
could be taken only from decisions of a board of adjustment.
Thus, the court of appeals viewed the Clearfield City zoning
ordinance, which fixed the city council, and not the board of
adjustments, as the appellate body for conditional uses, as contrary to the enabling act then in force. According to the court of
appeals, "[ w ]here a route of review is provided by a state stat-

(a) presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid; and
(h) determine only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, capricious,
or illegal.
(5) The court shall affirm the decision of the board of adjustment if the
decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record.
(6)(a) The hoard of adjustment shall transmit to the reviewing court the
record of its proceedings including its minutes, findings, orders and, if
available, a true and correct transcript of its proceedings.
(b) If the proceeding was tape recorded, a transcript of that tape recording is a true and correct transcript for purposes of this subsection.
(7)(a)(i) If there is a record, the district court's review is limited to the
record provided by the board of adjustment.
(ii) The court may not accept or consider any evidence outside the
board of adjustment's record unless that evidence was offered to the board
of adjustment and the court determines that it was improperly excluded
by the board of adjustment.
(h) If there is no record, the court may call witnesses and take evidence.
(8)(a) The filing of a petition does not stay the decision of the board of
adjustment.
(b)(i) Before filing the petition, the aggrieved party may petition the
board of adjustment to stay its decision.
(ii) Upon receipt of a petition to stay, the board of adjustment may
order its decision stayed pending district court review if the board of
adjustment finds it to be in the best interest of the municipality.
(iii) After the petition is filed the petitioner may seek an injunction
staying the board of adjustment's decision.
(*All of the provisions of§§ 10-9-708 and 17-27-708 are moved unchanged into the
section above, except for subsections (1) and (3) of §§ 10-9-708 and 17-27-708,
which are deleted.)
641. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-15 (1953) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added). In
relation to the present enabling acts, compare id. §§ 10-9-708(1) (1992), 17-27708(1) (1991) ("[a]ny person adversely affected by any decision of a board of adjustment") with id. §§ 10-9-1001(2), 17-27-1001(2) ("[a]ny person adversely affected by
any decision").
642. 7fi6 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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ute, a municipality lacks the power to alter that scheme."643
Moreover, the Clearfield City zoning ordinance (allowing appeals from a board of adjustment or a city council) was invalid
because it "fail[ed] to provide for final review of zoning matters
by a board of adjustment ... and endeavor[ed] to vest the City
Council with the final determination of conditional use permits."644

B.

"Any Person Adversely Affected"

The city and county enabling acts provide that "any person
adversely affected" by any decision may appeal to the
courts. 645 This language does not appear any different in substance from the language of the former enabling acts which
allowed "any person aggrieved" to appeal to the courts. 646 In
Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 647 the Utah Supreme
Court quoted O'Connor v. Board of Zoning Appeals,648 a 1953
Connecticut decision, to explain when a person is aggrieved
within the meaning of the former enabling acts:
Any landowner or resident within [the] city whose situation is such that [a] decision of [the] planning board may
adversely affect him in [the] use of property owned or occupied by him in some manner within [the] scope or purposes of
the zoning ordinance would be "aggrieved" within [the] statute giving any person aggrieved [a] right of appeal from [_the]
board's decisio,. 649

C.

Scope of Appeal

On appeal, the scope of the remedy in cities and counties is
that the district court may "determine only whether or not the
decision is arbitrary, capricious, or illegal."650 The acts pro-

643. !d. at 707.
644. !d. at 708. For a dis<:ussion of the correct remedy to be followed by a
plaintiff where the structure of administrative appeals violates the enabling acts,
see discussion infra part VII.G.2.
645. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(2) (1992), 17-27-1001(2) (1991) (emphasis
added).
646. !d. §§ 10-9-9(1), 17-27-16 (1953) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added).
647. 392 P.2d 40 (Utah 1964).
648. 98 A.2d 515 (Conn. 1953).
649. !d. at 581, quoted in Lund, 392 P.2d at 42.
650. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(3)(b) (1992), 17-27-1001(3)(b) (1991).
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vide that "[t]he courts shall ... presume that land use decisions and regulations are valid."651 This language appears to
be a legislative reaffirmation of the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake
City.Bsz
The earlier city enabling act allowed the appealing party "a
plenary action for relief."653 Mr. Xanthos, who had been refused a variance, persuaded the trial judge that this language
permitted him a trial de novo in relation to which "the court
has the same power as the board of adjustment to review the
facts." 654 The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and reversed
the trial court, holding that "the role of the district court in reviewing the Board of Adjustment's decision is to determine
whether the action taken was so unreasonable as to be arbitrary and capricious."655 The court held that "it was not [the
trial court judge's] prerogative to weigh the evidence anew. His
role was limited to determining whether there was evidence in
the record to support the Board of Adjustment's action."656

D. Procedure
A zoning appeal is made by filing "a petition for review of
the decision with the district court within 30 days after the
local decision is rendered."657 The enabling acts provide that
"[d]ecisions of the board of adjustment become effective at the
meeting in which the decision is made, unless a different time
is designated in the board's rules or at the time the decision is
made."658 In relation to zoning appeals, it has been held that
the Utah Administrative Procedures Act659 "applies only to
state and not to local agencies."660

E. Administrative Remedies
Although "any decision" may be appealed to the courts, the
city and county acts explicitly provide that decisions cannot be
651.
652.
653.
654.
655.
656.
657.
658.
659.
660.

!d. §§ 10-9-1001(3)(a), 17-27-1001(3)(a).
685 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1984).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-15 (1953) (repealed 1991).
Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1033.
!d. at 1034-35.
ld. at 1035.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(2) (1992), 17-27-1001(2) {1991).
ld. §§ 10-9-702(6) (1992), 17-27-702(6) (Supp. 1994) (emphasis added).
!d. §§ 63-46b-1 to -22 (Supp. 1994).
Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d 704, 706 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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challenged in the courts "until [the appellant] has exhausted
his administrative remedies."661 In this context, the administrative remedy referred to is an administrative appeal to the
board of adjustment, unless another body is designated for that
purpose. 662
In earlier years, the rule of exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not consistently applied or stated in the absolute
terms that it is described above. For example, in Smith v.
Barrett, 663 a plaintiff who was denied a building permit by
the Logan city commission appealed directly to the courts and
not to the board of adjustment, without a procedural challenge.
Similarly, in Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., 664 the Utah
Supreme Court held that, in the alternative, the rights of an
appellant were such that an "appeal from that administrative
ruling [the issuance of a building permit] should have been
taken to the proper administrative tribunal, or a suit should
have been commenced in the courts within the statutory peri,665
0 d.
However, by at least 1979, the requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted was viewed more strictly. In
Seal v. Mapleton City, 666 the Utah Supreme Court affirmed
the refusal to approve a subdivision plat on substantive
grounds noting, however, that "this matter could properly have
been disposed of on procedural grounds [inter alia, failure to
exhaust the administrative remedy of appeal to the board of
adjustment]."667 Thereafter, in three cases, appeals to the
courts were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. In Levie v. Sevier County, 668 a subdivision plat was
rejected by the county commission, and the landowner responded by appealing directly to the courts. Citing its decisions in
Lund and Seal, thA Utah Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of
the complaint on the grounds that "[t]his Court has previously

661.
(1991).
662.
663.
664.
665.
666.
667.
668.

UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(1) (1992); see also id. § 17-27-1001(1)

!d. §§ 10-9-704 (1992), 17-27-704 (Supp. 1994).
20 P.2d 864 (Utah 1933).
392 P.2d 40 (Utah 1964).
!d. at 42 (emphasis added).
598 P.2d 1346 (Utah 1979).
Id. at 1347.
617 P.2d 331 (Utah 1980).
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held that administrative remedies must first be exhausted
before mandamus willlie."669
In Merrihew v. Salt Lake County Planning and Zoning
Commission, 670 the petitioner appealed the refusal of the
planning commission to issue a building permit directly to the
courts and not to the board of adjustment. The response of the
Utah Supreme Court was to dismiss the petitioner's mandamus
claim on the grounds that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedy of appeal to the board of adjustment. 671 The
result was the same in Hatch v. Utah County Planning Department,672 in which Utah's high court, citing Merrihew, dismissed the plaintiff's claim for an extraordinary writ because
he failed to appeal the refusal to grant a building permit to the
board of adjustment. 673

F. Record on Appeal
As noted above, the role of a district court in a zoning
appeal is to determine whether there is "evidence in the record"
to support the administrative decision below. 674 Thus, the existence of an adequate administrative record is critical. However, the only statutory requirements with respect to the administrative record are that a board of adjustment is required to
keep minutes showing the vote of its members and "records of
its examinations and other official actions." 675 In addition, the
board "may, but is not required to, have its proceedings contemporaneously transcribed by a court reporter or a tape recorder [sic]."676
There is, accordingly, no guarantee that the administrative
record will be adequate, and thus the decision in Xanthos focused, inter alia, on the course to be followed if it is not. The
Xanthos court referred to an administrative hearing it had reviewed in Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Central Weber

669. !d. at 3a2.
670. 659 P.2d 1065 (Utah 1983).
671. !d. ai 1067.
672. 681i P.2d 550 (Utah 1984).
673. !d. ai 5/il.
674. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Salt Lake City, 685 P.2d 1032, 1035
(Utah 1984).
675. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-702(4)(b)(ii) (1992), 17-27-702(4)(b)(ii) (Supp.
1994).
676. !d. §§ 10-9-702(4)(c), 17-27 -702(4)(c).

94

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 9

Sewer Improvement District, 677 wherein it stated, "where
there was nothing to review, the reviewing court must be allowed to get at the facts." 678 The Xanthos court noted that in
the instant case there was no record of the proceedings before
the board of adjustment and consequently permitted the following alternative:
Since there is no record of the proceedings, due process would
be denied if the district court could not get at the facts.
Therefore, the court must be allowed to take its own evidence
and need not necessarily be limited to the evidence presented
before the Board of Adjustment. This does not mean that the
hearing in the district court should be a retrial on the merits,
or that the district court can substitute its judgment for that
of the Board. 679

In Davis County v. Clearfield City, 680 although presented
with an "extensive" record, the trial court nevertheless received
additional testimony. The court was concemed about both a
"secretive" and unreported "pre-meeting'' of the city council,
and the refusal of the planning commission to support its decision with formal findings. 681 The court of appeals found no
conflict with the holding in Xanthos, and observed in a footnote:
We note that in taking additional evidence and making its
detailed findings, the trial court made a fair and disciplined
effort to understand the basis for the city's decision. In no
sense did it venture beyond its role as the court was said to
have done in Xanthos and decide the case "according to lits]
notion of what was in the best interests of the citizens" of
Clearfield City. 682

677. 287 P.2d 884 (Utah 1955).
678. Xanthos, 685 P.2d at 1034.
679. ld. at 1034.
680. 756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
681. !d. at 709-10.
682. !d. at 710 n.7; see also Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 794 P.2d 482,
486 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
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G. Extraordinary Relief (Mandamus)
1. Petition for review
Historically it has been common for plaintiffs to "appeal"
administrative zoning decisions to the courts by petitioning for
issuance of a writ of mandamus,683 but it is now clear that
the correct remedy is the filing of a petition for review. Thus,
both enabling acts require that the remedy for "any person
adversely affected by any decision" made in the exercise of
provisions of the enabling acts is "a petition for review of the
decision with the district court."684
The requirement that a petition for review, and not a writ
of mandamus, is the proper remedy on appeal is a statutory
reaffirmation of the holding of the Utah Supreme Court in
Crist v. Mapleton City. 685 In that case, the city council and
the board of adjustment both refused to authorize a building
permit, and the plaintiff responded by filing a petition for a
writ of mandamus in the district court. On appeal, the Utah
Supreme Court noted that the enabling act then in force permitted an appeal from the administrative decision in the form
of "a plenary action for relief,"686 which action for relief the
plaintiff had ignored. The consequence, the court held, was
that,
By ignoring a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law,
the plaintiffs placed themselves out of reach of the extraordinary writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is not a substitute for and cannot be used in civil proceedings to serve the
purpose of appeal, certiorari, or writ of error. 687

2. Proper use of mandamus
There may be instances where extraordinary relief in the
form of a writ of mandamus may be used. For example, in
Davis County v. Clearfield City, 688 the zoning ordinance improperly permitted the city council to hear appeals relating to
the grant or denial of a conditional use permit. The result was

683.
684.
685.
686.
687.
688.

For examples of this practice, see discussion supra part V.I.l.
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 10-9-1001(2) (1992), 17-27-1001(2) (1991).
497 P.2d 633 (Utah 1972).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-15 (1953) (repealed 1991).
Crist, 497 P.2d at 634.
756 P.2d 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

96

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 9

that the applicant could no longer appeal from "any decision of
the board of adjustment"689 as the former enabling statute
contemplated. Under these facts, the courts approved the plaintiffs use of "extraordinary relief" pursuant to Rule 65B of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
Clearfield City cannot be heard to complain about the
inappropriateness of the county's choice of procedure for obtaining judicial review [Rule 65B] in light of its own, flawed
conditional use permit procedures. Simply put, Clearfield City
imposed on the county a procedure inconsistent with that
envisioned in the enabling act. Having done so, it cannot
insist on the method of district court review envisioned in
that act. 690

The Clearfield City scenario repeated itself in Salt Lake
County Cottonwood Sanitary District v. Sandy City, 691 in
which the city council (operating under the optional councilmayor form of government) violated separation of powers requirements by appointing itself to hear conditional use permit
appeals. Because the administrative process was flawed, the
case proceeded without objection as a claim for extraordinary
relief. 692

H.

Interpretation

A final matter faced by the courts is the interpretation of
words or phrases from local zoning ordinances. The judiciary in
these decisions has held that words in a zoning ordinance
should be interpreted by giving them their common meaning.693 Words or phrases which the courts have interpreted
include the following: "public semi-public buildings,"694 "occupied trailer house or mobile home,"695 "feed lot,'*' 96 and
"school."697

689. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-9-15 (195::1) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added).
690. Davis County v. Clearfield City, 756 P.2d at 708.
691. 879 P.2d 1379 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
692. ld. at 1380.
693. Clinton City v. Patterson, 433 P.2d 7, 9 (Utah 1967).
694. Provo City v. Claudio, 63 P.2d 570, 573 (Utah 1936).
695. Salem City v. Farnsworth, 75::1 P.2d 514, 515 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (emphasis added).
696. Patterson, 433 P.2d at 9.
697. Crist v. Mapleton City, 497 P.2d 633 (Utah 1972).

1]

UTAH ZONING LAW
VIII.

97

CONCLUSION

The Senate floor debates indicate that the legislature correctly interpreted our case law .... "698

A. Accomplishments of the Enabling Acts
Adoption by the legislature of the Municipal Land Use
Development and Management Act and the County Land Use
Development and Management Act was a major step forward.
Adoption of these acts accomplished at least the following: ( 1)
the former enabling statutes were comprehensively reorganized
and placed in a logical order; (2) the enabling statutes for cities
and counties were placed in similar language and format; and,
(3) many (but certainly not all) obsolete provisions of the previous enabling acts were eliminated. 699

B. Proposals for Legislative Change
However, some flaws exist in the new acts, many of which
were simply carried from the old enabling statutes into the new
enabling statutes. Whatever their origin, these flaws-which
have been described throughout this article under the heading
of Proposed Legislative Change-should be corrected. In summary form, the enabling acts should be amended to incorporate
the following sixteen proposals: ( 1) a planning commission is
required 700 ; (2) a county zoning ordinance may determine the
number and terms of planning commission members 701 ; (3)
the term of office for a county planning commission chair is not
limited to one year 702 ; (4) a general plan must be adopted before a zoning ordinance is adopted 703 ; (5) a planning commission must hold hearings on the zoning ordinance it will propose
to the legislative body70\ (6) initiatives and referenda705

698. Citizen's Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117, 1122 n.2 (Utah
1994).
699. For example, the obsolete "official map" was eliminated. See supra text
accompanying note 355.
700. See discussion supra part II.A.
701. See discussion supra part II.B.
702. See discussion supra part II.C.
703. See discussion supra part II.E.l.
704. See discussion supra part III.E.
705. The provisions on initiatives and referenda are located in Title 20, Chapter 11 of the Utah Cude and are technically not part of the enabling acts. See

98

BYU JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 9

may be used to rezone where (i) the change is a material
change in zoning policy, (ii) the complexity of the proposal is
such that the average voter can easily understand it, and (iii)
the voting process will not unreasonably interfere with the efficient operation of the government body; and, (7) a "conditional
use permit" is defined as a type of "special exception." 706
In addition, (8) temporary zoning regulations may be
adopted without obtaining the recommendation of the planning
commission 707 ; (9) divisions of land for commercial, manufacturing, or industrial purposes, or into relatively small parcels for agricultural purposes, should be made subject to the
county subdivision ordinance 708 ; (10) a county board of adjustment should have five members 709 ; (11) members of a city
board of adjustment should serve a length of term prescribed in
the zoning ordinance 710 ; (12) a county board of adjustment
should be entitled to interpret the zoning maps without special
authorization in the zoning ordinance 711 ; (13) the time to appeal to a board of adjustment should be ten days unless the
zoning ordinance provides otherwise 712 ; (14) action by a county board of adjustment to reverse an administrative decision
should require the affirmative vote of three out of five members713; (15) unless the legislative body otherwise provides,
the board of adjustment should have jurisdiction to hear (i)
zoning appeals, (ii) special exceptions (including conditional use
permits), (iii) nonconforming use issues, and, (iv) the board of
adjustment should have exclusive jurisdiction to grant variances 714 ; and, (16) duplicative provisions describing appeals to
the courts should be combined and reconciled. 715

generally discussion supra part III.F.
706. See discussion supra part III.H.
707. See discussion supra part III.J.
708. See discussion supra part IV.A.
709. See discussion supra part VI.A.
710. See discussion supra part VI.A.
711. See discussion supra part VI.F.
712. See discussion supra part VI.F.
713. See discussion supra part VI.F.
714. See discussion supra part VI.I-J.
715. See discussion supra part VILA.

